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01-1444 Chavez v. Martinez
Ruling Below: (Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 9 ,h Cir. 270 F.3d 852, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis
23401, 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9265, 2001 DailyJournal DAR 11637)
The court held that a reasonable police officer in a situation where the officer interviewed a
wounded suspect during medical treatment without reading Miranda warnings could not
believe that the interrogation of the suspect would comport with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, thus qual-ified immunity was not available to that officer.
Question Presented: Whether a police officer who conducts a coercive, custodial
interrogation of a suspect who is being treated for life-threatening, police-inflicted gunshot




CITY OF OXNARD; Oxnard Police Department; Art Lopez, Chief; Maria Pena;
Andrew Salinas; Ron Zavala, Defendants, and Ben CHAVEZ, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided October 30, 2001
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
We must determine whether a police
officer who conducts a coercive, custodial
interrogation of a suspect who is being
treated for life-threatening, police-inflicted
gunshot wounds may invoke qualified
immunity in a civil suit for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001). Under the
circumstances of this case, we hold he
may not.
I
On November 28, 1997, police officers
Maria Pena and Andrew Salinas were
investigating narcotics activity near a
vacant lot in a residential area of Oxnard,
California. While questioning one
individual, they heard a bicycle
approaching on the darkened path that
traversed the lot. Officer Salinas ordered
the rider, Oliverio Martinez, to stop,
dismount, spread his legs, and place his
hands behind his head. Martinez
complied.
During a protective pat-down frisk,
Officer Salinas discovered a knife in Mr.
Martinez's waistband. Officer Salinas
alerted his partner and pulled Martinez's
hand from behind his head to apply
handcuffs. Officer Salinas claims that
Martinez pulled away from him. Martinez
alleges that he offered no resistance.
Either way, Officer Salinas tackled
Martinez and a struggle ensued.
Both officers testified that during the
struggle Martinez did not attempt to hit or
kick them; Officer Salinas struck the only
blow. The officers maintain that Martinez
drew Officer Salinas's gun and pointed it
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at them. Martinez alleges that Officer
Salinas began to draw his gun and that
Martinez grabbed Officer Salinas's hand
to prevent him from doing so.
All parties agree that Officer Salinas cried
out, "He's got my gun." Officer Pena
drew her weapon and fired several times.
One bullet struck Martinez in the face,
damaging his optic nerve and rendering
him blind. Another bullet fractured a
vertebrae, paralyzing his legs. Three more
bullets tore through his leg around the
knee joint. The officers then handcuffed
Martinez.
The patrol supervisor, Sergeant Ben
Chavez, arrived on the scene minutes later
along with paramedics. While Sergeant
Chavez discussed the incident with
Officer Salinas, the paramedics removed
the handcuffs so they could stabilize
Martinez's neck and back and loaded him
into the ambulance. Sergeant Chavez rode
to the emergency room in the ambulance
with Martinez to obtain his version of
what had happened.
As emergency room personnel treated
Martinez, Sergeant Chavez began a taped
interview. Chavez did not preface his
questions by reciting Miranda warnings.
The interview lasted 45 minutes. The
medical staff asked Chavez to leave the
trauma room several times, but the tape
shows that he returned and resumed
questioning. Chavez turned off the tape
recorder each time medical personnel
removed him from the room. The
transcript of the recorded conversation
totals about ten minutes and provides an
incontrovertible account of the interview.
Sergeant Chavez pressed Martinez with
persistent, directed questions regarding
the events leading up to the shooting.
Most of Martinez's answers were non-
responsive. He complained that he was in
pam, was choking, could not move his
legs, and was dying. He drifted in and out
of consciousness. By the district court's
tally, "during the questioning at the
hospital, [Martinez] repeatedly begged for
treatment; he told [Sergeant Chavez] he
believed he was dying eight times;
complained that he was in extreme pami
on fourteen separate occasions; and twice
said he did not want to talk any more."
Chavez stopped only when medical
personnel moved Martinez out of the
emergency room to perform a C.A.T.
scan.
Martinez filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the officer
defendants violated his constitutional
rights by stopping him without probable
cause, using excessive force, and
subjecting him to a coercive interrogation
while he was receiving medical care. He
moved for summary judgment on each of
his claims. The district court denied
Sergeant Chavez's defense of qualified
immunity and granted summary judgment
for Martinez on his claim that Chavez
violated his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by coercing statements
from him during medical treatment.! In
this interlocutory appeal, Chavez argues
that the district court erred by holding
that he was not entitled to qualified
unmunity.
II
We have jurisdiction over Sergeant
Chavez's interlocutory appeal of the
purely legal question whether he is entitled
to qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 528, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105
S. Ct. 2806 (1985). We review de novo the
The district court denied summary judgment on
Martinez's claims that he was Improperly stopped
by the police and that they used excessive force
against him. Those claims will be tried to a jury.
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district court's determination on summary
judgment that Chavez cannot invoke
qualified immunity as a bar to civil
litigation. Robinson v. Prunty, 249 F.3d
862, 865-66 (9th Cir. 2001). For the
purposes of this interlocutory appeal, we
must accept as true the facts alleged by
Martinez and determine whether Chavez
is nonetheless entitled to qualified
immunity as a matter of law. Id. at 866.
Section 1983 permits an individual whose
federal constitutional or statutory rights
have been violated by a public official
acting under color of state law to sue the
official for damages. Public officials are
afforded protection, however, "from
undue interference with their duties and
from potentially disabling threats of
liability." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 806, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct.
2727 (1982). Qualified immunity shields
them "from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." Id. at 818.
Only conduct that an official could not
reasonably have believed was legal under
settled law falls outside the protective
sanctuary of qualified immunity. Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 116 L. Ed. 2d
589, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991) (per curiam).
To determine whether Sergeant Chavez is
entitled to qualified immunity, we must
first determine whether Martinez has
stated a prima facie claim that Chavez
violated one of his constitutional rights.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 150 L. Ed.
2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2001). If we
determine that Martinez has stated a
prima facie case, then we must determine
whether the right allegedly violated was
clearly established by federal law. Id. We
hold that Chavez violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting
Martinez to a coercive, custodial
interrogation while he received treatment
for life-threatening gunshot wounds
inflicted by other police officers.
In Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
286, 80 L. Ed. 682, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1936), a
unanimous Supreme Court condemned
police officers' use of violence to coerce
confessions from criminal suspects as
"revolting to the sense of justice"
embodied in the Constitution. Although
the coercive tactics employed by the
police in Brown involved physical
violence, the Court clarified in subsequent
opinions that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments also proscribe more subtle
forms of police coercion. [Citations
omitted]
Chief Justice Warren observed in
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206,
4 L. Ed. 2d 242, 80 S. Ct. 274 (1960), that
"coercion can be mental as well as
physical, and .. . the blood of the accused
is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition." A police
officer's extraction of a confession is
unconstitutional if, "considering the
totality of the circumstances, the [officer]
obtained the statement by physical or
psychological coercion or by improper
inducement so that the suspect's will was
overborne." United States v. Coleman,
208 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quotations and citation omitted); see also
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689,
123 L. Ed. 2d 407, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
Martinez argues that, considering the
totality of the circumstances, Sergeant
Chavez's interrogation was coercive and
that it therefore violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Chavez's
coercive, custodial questioning violated
the plaintiff's substantive Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory
self-incrimination. Cooper, 963 F.2d at
1235. Under Cooper, a Fifth Amendment
violation occurs when a police officer
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coerces self-incriminating statements from
a suspect in custody. Id. at 1236-37, 1242-
44. The plaintiff in that case stated a cause
of action under 5 1983 for violation of his
Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination by alleging that police
officers used deception and psychological
coercion to extract statements from him.
Id. at 1242-43. Sitting en banc, we held
that the officers' conduct violated the
Fifth Amendment even though the
plaintiff was never prosecuted, noting that
the Fifth Amendment's purpose is to
prevent coercive interrogation practices
that are "destructive of human dignity."
Id. at 1239 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 457-58, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86
S. Ct. 1602 (1966)). We echoed the
Supreme Court's holding in Miranda that
this animating purpose was adequately
achieved only if the Fifth Amendment
cast its protection against coerced self-
incrimination not just over the
courthouse, but also over the jailhouse,
the police station, and other settings in
which law enforcement authority was
invoked to curtail a criminal suspect's
freedom of action in any significant way.
963 F.2d at 1239.
Here, as in Cooper, a police officer's
conduct "actively compelled and coerced"
a plaintiff to utter statements that the
plaintiff could reasonably believe might be
used in a criminal prosecution or lead to
evidence that might be so used. Id. at
1243; [citations omitted]. We affirm the
district court's holding that Officer
Chavez cannot invoke qualified immunity
as a defense to Martinez's Fifth
Amendment claims.2
2 We recognize the existence of Supreme Court
dicta to the contrary. See United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) ("The
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right
of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law
Likewise, a police officer violates the
Fourteenth Amendment when he obtains
a confession by coercive conduct,
regardless of whether the confession is
subsequently used at trial.
The due process violation caused by
coercive behavior of law-enforcement
officers in pursuit of a confession is
complete with the coercive behavior itself
.... The actual use or attempted use of
that coerced statement in a court of law is
not necessary to complete the affront to
the Constitution.
We must now determine whether the
rights that Martinez alleges Chavez
violated were clearly established by federal
law.
The contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing
violates that right. This is not to say that
an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in
question has been previously held
unlawful, but it is to say that in light of
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640,
97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987)
(internal citations omitted). We must
determine, in other words, whether a
reasonable officer in Sergeant Chavez's
position would have known that his
conduct violated Martinez's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free
enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately
impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs
only at trial."). Where the two are at odds,
however, we are bound to follow our own binding
precedent rather than Supreme Court dicta. See
Ayala v. United States , 550 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th
Cir. 1977) (holding that Supreme Court dicta is not
binding).
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from coercive interrogation. Because
"whether [a] confession was obtained by
coercion or improper inducement can be
determined only by an examination of all
of the attendant circumstances," Haynes,
373 U.S. at 513, our holding will
necessarily be a narrow one confined to
the specific facts of this case...
The record before us reveals that Sergeant
Chavez doggedly pursued a statement by
Martinez despite being asked to leave the
emergency room several times. He
ignored Martinez's pleas to withhold
questioning until he had received medical
treatment. A reasonable officer,
questioning a suspect who had been shot
five times by the police and then arrested,
who had not received Miranda warnings,
and who was receiving medical treatment
for excruciating, life-threatening injuries
that sporadically caused him to lose
consciousness, would have known that
persistent interrogation of the suspect
despite repeated requests to stop violated
the suspect's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from
coercive interrogation.
The Supreme Court held a virtually
indistinguishable interrogation
unconstitutional in Minceyv. Arizona:
[The officer] ceased the interrogation only
during intervals when [the suspect] lost
consciousness or received medical
treatment, and after each such
interruption returned relentlessly to his
task. The statements at issue were thus the
result of virtually continuous questioning
of a seriously and painfully wounded man
on the edge of consciousness.
437 U.S. 385, 401, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 98 S.
Ct. 2408, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 115 (1978);
but cf. United States v. George, 987 F.2d
1428, 1430-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that interrogation in the hospital of a
coherent suspect who has received
Miranda warnings is not unconstitutional);
United States v. Lewis, 833 F.2d 1380,
1384 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding voluntary a
statement elicited from a suspect just after
she returned from surgery and emerged
from the effects of general anesthetic
where the suspect was alert, responsive,
and unresisting).
To the extent Sergeant Chavez's conduct
differs from that of the officers in Mincey,
it is more egregious. Sergeant Chavez did
not read Martinez his Miranda warnings.
See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S.
737, 740, 16 L. Ed. 2d 895, 86 S. Ct. 1761
(1966) ("That a defendant was not advised
of his right to remain silent or of his right
respecting counsel at the outset of
interrogation . . is a significant factor in
considering the voluntariness of
statements later made."); Miranda, 384
U.S. at 467 ("Without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation ...
contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so
freely."). Chavez persisted in questioning
Martinez during, not after, medical
treatment. Although Martinez did not, like
Mincey, affirmatively request counsel, he
repeatedly requested that Sergeant Chavez
refrain from interviewing him until his
medical treatment was complete and his
life was no longer in danger.
In light of the extreme circumstances in
this case, a reasonable police officer in
Sergeant Chavez's position could not have
believed that the interrogation of suspect
Martinez comported with the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly,
the district court did not err by holding
that on these facts qualified immunity was
not available to Chavez to insulate him
from Martinez's civil rights suit for
damages. [... ]
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Justices Take Up Police Interrogation Case;
Law: The Supreme Court Will Consider Whether an Oxnard Officer Had the Right to
Pressure a Badly Injured Man for a Statement
Los Angeles Times
June 4, 2002
David G. Savage and Tracy Wilson
The Supreme Court, taking up an appeal
from the Oxnard police, agreed Monday
to decide whether officers are shielded
from being sued if they pressure a badly
wounded victim of a police shooting to
confess his wrongdoing in a hospital
emergency room.
Oliverio Martinez, a 32-year-old farm
worker, was left blind and paralyzed after
a run-in with Oxnard police on a
November evening in 1997.
Martinez was riding a bicycle home and
took a shortcut across a vacant lot. Two
officers, investigating a tip about drug
dealing nearby, ordered him to stop and
dismount, which he did. When an officer
grabbed a knife in his waistband, the two
struggled. Martinez allegedly reached for
the officer's gun, and a policewoman shot
him five times, including once in the
temple. Taken to a hospital, Martinez said
he was dying. Sgt. Ben Chavez, suspecting
the same, went along in the ambulance in
hopes of getting a tape-recorded
statement that would exonerate the
officers.
In pain, Martinez repeatedly asked the
sergeant to leave, as did hospital workers.
"I am choking. I am dying," Martinez said
in a taped conversation.
"OK, yes. Tell me what happened,"
Chavez said. "If you are going to die, tell
me what happened."
But Martinez survived, and he sued
Oxnard police for violating his
constitutional rights by stopping him
illegally, for using excessive force and for
seeking to force a confession from his
hospital bed.
A federal judge in Los Angeles and the
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals cleared
the case to go to trial, but the Supreme
Court intervened Monday, saying it will
first hear the city's claim that Chavez is
immune from being sued for his effort to
extract a statement from the wounded
man.
A ruling in Chavez vs. Martinez, 01- 1444,
due next year, will decide whether the
police can use coercive methods to obtain
statements, as long as the person's words
are not used against him in a criminal case.
Alan E. Wisotsky, the city's attorney,
argued that the constitutional ban on
coercive questioning by the police applies
only to suspects who are in custody.
Moreover, it covers only incriminating
statements that are used in a criminal case,
he said.
"First, [Martinez] was not in custody. If he
had had a miraculous recovery, he was
free to leave," Wisotsky said in a
telephone interview. "Second, at no time
did Martinez ask for an attorney. And
third, Miranda only applies to statements
introduced at a criminal trial."
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His appeal to the high court says the civil
suit against Chavez should be thrown out
because the city had no criminal case
against Martinez.
Martinez "was never charged with any
crime," the appeal said. So the hospital-
bed statements were not "sought to be
introduced against him in any criminal
proceeding."
Cities routinely defend their police
officers in civil suits and are ultimately
responsible for paying damages that might
result.
The hospital conversation loomed large in
pretrial discussions, lawyers on both sides
said.
Oxnard's lawyers wanted to tell a jury that
Martinez admitted he had grabbed the
officer's gun and pointed it at an officer
and therefore was largely responsible for
the shooting.
Lawyers for Martinez deny he made such
an admission. They argue that it is
unconscionable to use comments from a
shooting victim who is in intense pain.
Under Supreme Court precedent, police
officers are immune from being sued
unless they violate a constitutional right
that is clear and well-established.
In November, the 9th Circuit rejected
Chavez's claim of immunity.
Judge Richard Tallman said the sergeant
stayed in the emergency room area for 45
minutes and refused repeated requests to
leave. He also did not give Martinez the
so-called Miranda warnings.
"A reasonable officer, questioning a
suspect who had been shot five times by
the police and then arrested, who was
receiving medical treatment for
excruciating, life-threatening injuries that
sporadically caused him to lose
consciousness, would have known that
persistent interrogation of the suspect,
despite repeated requests to stop, violated
his [constitutional] right to be free from
coercive interrogation," Tallman wrote for
a unanimous court.
Los Angeles attorney R Samuel Paz, who
is representing Martinez, had urged the
high court to deny the city's appeal so the
case could go to trial.
"This is a tragic case. [Martinez] is blind
and paralyzed. He is living with his father,
but he needs physical therapy and regular
care," Paz said
While sympathizing with Martinez's
condition, Wisotsky said the city and its
officers are not responsible. "Sure, it's
tragic, but he made a huge mistake....
When you grab a gun and point it at a
police officer, they have a right to act in
self defense," he said.
Savage reported from Washington and
Wilson from Ventura.
Copyright 0 2002 Los Angeles Times
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01-1231 Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe
Ruling Below: (Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety, 2nd Cir., 271 F.3d 38, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis
22517)
The court held that sex offenders are entitled to the opportunity to have a hearing consistent
with due process principles to determine whether or not they are particularly likely to be
currently dangerous before being labeled as such by their inclusion in a publicly disseminated
registry.
Question Presented: Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevent a
State from listing convicted sex offenders in a publicly disseminated registry without first
affording such offenders individualized hearings on their current dangerousness.
John DOE, et al., Plaintiff-Appellee- Cros s-Appellant,
V.
DEPT. of PUBLIC SAFETY on behalf of Henry C. Lee, Comm., Office of Adult
Probation, on behalf of Robert Bosco Director, John Armstrong, Comm., Defendants-
Appellants- Cros s-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
Decided October 19, 2001
SACK, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we address the
constitutionality of Connecticut's version
of "Megan's Law," Conn. Gen. Stat. 55
54-250-261 (2001), amended by 2001
Conn. Legis. Serv. 01-84 (West), which
requires people convicted or found not
guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect of designated crimes to register
with the State, and mandates disclosure of
the information contained in the registry
to the public in printed form and through
the State's Internet website. The United
States District Court for the District of
Connecticut (Robert N. Chatigny, Judge),
in a thorough opinion, held that the law
violates the plaintiff's right to procedural
due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution but does not constitute an ex
post facto law in violation of Article I, 5
10 thereof. Doe v. Lee, 132 F. Supp. 2d
57 (D. Conn. 2001) ("Doe v. Lee")...
We are keenly aware of the legitimate and
pressing importance that the Connecticut
legislature attaches to the State's ability to
disseminate information about former sex
offenders, principally in order to protect
the health and welfare of the State's
children. The particular legislative
instrument it has chosen to employ,
however, is too blunt properly to achieve
that end. It fails to accommodate the
constitutional rights of persons formerly
convicted of a wide range of sexual
offenses who are branded as likely to be
currently dangerous offenders irrespective




I. The Connecticut Law
Connecticut's version of [Megan's] law
requires registration of people who have
been convicted of crimes that fall within
four statutorily defined categories:
criminal offenses against a victim who is a
minor, nonviolent sexual offenses,
sexually violent offenses, and felonies
committed for a sexual purpose. See
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250(2), (5), (11),
(12), 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a).
A. Registration
Registration requirements vary depending
on the type of crime for which a particular
person is convicted and thereby becomes
subject to the registration law. A person
convicted of a criminal offense against a
minor or of a nonviolent sexual offense
must register with the Connecticut
Department of Public Safety ("DPS") for
ten years beginning within three days
following his or her release into the
community. See id. 5 54-251(a). In
addition, a person convicted of a felony
committed for a sexual purpose can also
be required to register for ten years at the
discretion of the sentencing court. See id.
5 54-254(a). Finally, a person convicted of
a sexually violent offense must register for
the remainder of his or her life. See id. §
54-252(a).
Each registrant must provide the DPS
with his or her name, "identifying factors"
including fingerprints, a photograph, a list
of other identifying characteristics, and a
blood sample for DNA analysis, see id. §
54-250(3), criminal history record, and his
or her residence address, see id. % 54-
251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a), which must
be verified once a year, see id. 5 54-257(c).
Certain additional obligations apply to all
registrants regardless of their underlying
conviction. Anyone subject to the law
who moves to a new residence must
inform the State of his or her new address
within five days. See id. 5§ 54-251(a), 54-
252(a), 54-254(a). If a registrant regularly
travels into or temporarily resides in
another state, he or she must register with
the responsible agency there and comply
with whatever additional duties that state
imposes on sex offenders. See id. Each
registrant must abide by the statute's
address verification requirements by
completing and returning to the State
within ten days of receipt a
nonforwardable verification form. See id.
§ 54-257(c). Finally, anyone subject to the
law must submit to having his or her
photograph taken at a specified location
whenever the State so requests, see id. %
54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a), at least
once every five years, see id. 54-257(d).
Failure to comply with any of these duties
constitutes a class D felony, punishable by
up to five years in prison. See id. 5 54-
251(d), 54-252(d), 54-253(c), 54-254(b).
B. Disclosure and Public Notification
The statute also obligates DPS to compile
the information gathered through the
registration process in a central registry
and to share that information with local
police departments, state police troops,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
coordinate agencies in other states in
which registrants reside. See id. § 54-
257(a).
The DPS must also make the registry
available to the public "during normal
business hours." Id. 5 54 -258(a)(1). And
the DPS is required to post registry
information on the Internet, see id. 5 54-
258(a)(1), something it did until the
practice was enjoined by the district court
in this litigation...
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C. Exclusions and Restrictions
Certain people who would otherwise fall
within the scope of the law are eligible for
relief from these provisions. Two narrow
categories of offenders need not register
at all if a court so orders upon a finding
that "registration is not required for public
safety": anyone who was convicted of
engaging, while under nineteen years of
age, in sexual intercourse with a victim
who was between thirteen and sixteen
years old but at least two years younger
than the perpetrator; and anyone who was
convicted of subjecting another person to
sexual contact without the victim's
consent. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-251(b),
(c).
A court has discretion to order the DPS
to restrict public dissemination of
information about two other classes of
registrants -- those who were convicted
either of sexual assault in a spousal or
cohabiting relationship or of any crime
involving a victim under the age of 18 to
whom the offender is related -- if the
court finds that publication is not required
for public safety and would reveal the





I. Standard of Review
We review a district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo, construing
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. See Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).
Summary judgment is appropriate where
"there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and .. . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,"
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)...
II. Procedural Due Process Claim
We first address the defendants' appeal
from the district court's judgment with
respect to the due process claim.
The parties agree, as do we, with the
district court's conclusion that the "stigma
plus" test, first set forth in Paul, governs
the defendants' appeal. In Paul, the
Supreme Court held that in order to state
a claim under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 for a
violation of the Due Process Clause, a
plaintiff who complains of governmental
defamation must show (1) the utterance
of a statement about him or her that is
sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her
reputation, that is capable of being proved
false, and that he or she claims is false,
and (2) some tangible and material state-
imposed burden or alteration of his or her
status or of a right in addition to the
stigmatizing statement. See Paul, 424 U.S.
at 701-02, 710-11. This requirement is
known in this Circuit and elsewhere as the
"stigma plus" test. [citations omitted]
A. The "Stigma"
A "stigma" is "[a] mark or token of
infamy, disgrace, or reproach . . . ." The
American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 1702 (4th ed. 2000).
Publication of the Connecticut Sex
Offender Registry plainly "stigmatizes"
the people listed on it insofar as it asserts
that they are persons convicted of crimes
characterized by the State as sexual
offenses. But those assertions are
concededly true. The gravamen of
"stigma" as part of a due process violation
is the making under color of law of a
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reputation-tarnishing statement that is
false. [Citations omitted.] The plaintiff
therefore asserts not merely stigma, but
false stigma: that the Connecticut law
"violates [his] due process rights by
stigmatizing [him] as [a] presently
dangerous sex offender[]," which he
maintains is false and gives him a right to
a hearing comporting with due process
requirements to provide him with an
opportunity to prove that he is not in fact
a present threat to public safety...
To meet the stigma element of his claim,
then, the plaintiff is required to show a
stigmatizing statement about him made or
to be made under color of law that is
capable of being proved true or false. He
has only to allege, not prove, that the
statement is false in order to establish a
due process right to the hearing he seeks.
See Brandt v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs.,
820 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1987). It is at
such a hearing that the plaintiff would
have the opportunity to have his name
cleared and the false stigma thus avoided...
The sexual offender registry conveys the
message that some of the persons listed
on the registry are currently dangerous;
disclosing the identity of persons who are
currently a threat to public safety is the
sole avowed and legitimate purpose of the
registry. Even the disclaimer itself, by
asserting that the DPS "has made no
determination that any individual included
in the Registry is currently dangerous,"
clearly implies that some may be. But the
list is undifferentiated; it does not say
which registrants are or may be currently
dangerous and which are not.
The State of Connecticut contends that by
enjoining the publication of the
information on the registry, the district
court was doing no more than enjoining
the dissemination of truthful information
about the criminal history of the
registrants. That would be troubling if it
were so... We conclude, however, that the
district court's order does not target
truthful speech. Publication of the registry
in its present form implies that persons
listed on the registry are particularly likely
to be currently dangerous. Unless
everyone on the registry is particularly
likely to be dangerous, a proposition that
the State neither asserts nor embraces,
that implication is not true.
The listings alone, true or false -- the
"stigmatizing" by the State -- are not,
under Paul, actionable as due process
violations. But if "plus" factors are
present, the plaintiff is entitled to due
process to establish whether the
implication of likely dangerousness, as
applied to him, is false and to prevent its
communication to the public until he has
had that opportunity and has failed.
B. The "Plus" Factors
Having isolated the "stigma" that the
Connecticut sexual offender registry law
visits on registrants, then, we must inquire
whether there is a "plus" factor that gives
rise to a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause.
Prior to Paul, the concept of "liberty" in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment appears to have been widely
understood to encompass a person's
interest in his or her good name and
reputation, without more. See Laurence
F Tribe, American Constitutional Law 5
10-9 (2d ed. 1988). That principle seemed
to be established by the Supreme Court's
decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
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400 U.S. 433, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515, 91 S. Ct.
507 (1971). At issue there was a Wisconsin
statute that allowed local officials to post
in liquor stores a list of persons who
became dangerous after heavy drinking
and to forbid persons on the list from
purchasing alcohol for one year. The
officials were not required to notify
targeted persons or allow them to be
heard on the issue of whether they
deserved the "badge of infamy" that the
list imposed upon them. Id. at 437. The
Court invalidated the statute, stating that
"where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential." Id. At the heart of the Court's
reasoning was the recognition that
inclusion on the posted list
may to some be merely the mark of
illness, to others it is a stigma, an official
branding of a person. The label is a
degrading one...
* * *
In its 1976 decision in Paul, the Court
revisited the issue of government-imposed
stigma and reoriented this precedent. The
Court addressed a municipal police
department's practice of circulating to
local merchants flyers displaying
photographs of persons deemed to be
"active shoplifters." See Paul, 424 U.S. at
695. One such suspected shoplifter filed
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
under Constantineau the distribution of a
flyer containing his photograph violated
the Due Process Clause because it
damaged his reputation without affording
him the necessary procedural protections.
See id. at 696-97.
Writing for the majority, then-Justice
Rehnquist rejected this claim, declaring
that contrary to the plaintiff's view of
Constantmeau, an individual's "interest in
reputation . . . is neither 'liberty' nor
'property' guaranteed against state
deprivation without due process of law."
Paul, 424 U.S. at 712. The Court
acknowledged that it had "in a number of
... prior cases pointed out the frequently
drastic effect of the 'stigma' which may
result from defamation by the government
in a variety of contexts." Id. at 701. But in
each such case, the Paul Court reasoned, a
liberty interest was implicated only
because the state had not only stigmatized
the plaintiff, but had also impaired or
altered some other "more tangible
interest[]," such as "a right or status
previously recognized by state law." Id. at
701, 711. Thus, the Court observed, the
deprivation in Constantineau was stigma
plus the loss of the right, previously
recognized under state law, to purchase
alcohol; in Roth, the Court would have
found a liberty interest implicated by
stigma only if it was combined with
termination of government employment;
and in Goss, "liberty" was involved only
because there was stigma plus the
extinguishment of the state-law right to
public education.
Applying this holding to the case before
us, we agree with the district court that
the statutory registration duties imposed
on the plaintiff constitute a "plus" factor.
Those obligations (1) alter the plaintiff's
legal status, and (2) are "governmental in
nature," cf. McClary, 786 F.2d at 89,
insofar as they could not be imposed by a
private actor in a position analogous to
the state defendants, and therefore
differentiate the plaintiff's complaint from
a traditional defamation claim brought
under state law.
The registration duties imposed
Connecticut's sex offender law





exceptions, a person who is required to
register because he or she was convicted
of a criminal act against a minor, a
nonviolent sexual offense, or a felony with
a sexual purpose must verify his or her
address annually for ten years. See Conn.
Gen. Stat. % 54-251(a), 54-253(a), 54-
254(a), 54-257(c). Anyone who was
convicted of a sexually violent offense
must do so every ninety days for the rest
of his or her life. See id. U5 52-252(a), 54-
253(a), 54-257(c). To conduct this
verification, the state mails to a registrant's
last known address a nonforwardable
form that the registrant must complete
and return within ten days of receipt. See
id. $ 54-257(c). "In the event that a
registrant fails to return the address
verification form, the Department of
Public Safety shall notify the local police
department or the state police troop
having jurisdiction over the registrant's
last reported address, and that agency shall
apply for a warrant to be issued for the
registrant's arrest . . . ." Id.
Whenever any registrant changes his or
her address, he or she must notify the
Commissioner of Public Safety within five
days. See id. % 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-
254(a). If he or she "regularly travels into
or within another state or temporarily
resides in another state for purposes
including, but not limited to employment
or schooling," he or she must notify the
Connecticut Commissioner and register
with the appropriate agency in the other
state. Id. The registrant must also provide
blood samples for purposes of DNA
analysis when he or she is first registered
and must appear at a specified location to
have his or her photograph taken
whenever the Commissioner requests, see
id. 5 54-250(3), 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-
253(b),(c), 54-254(a), but at least once
every five years, see id. 5 54-257(d).
Failure to abide by any of these
obligations constitutes a class D felony,
punishable by up to five years in prison.
See id. §5 54-251(d), 54-252(b), 54-253(c),
54-254(b).
We think that these obligations, taken
together, easily qualify as a "plus" factor
under Paul. The imposition on a person
of a new set of legal duties that, if
disregarded, subject him or her to felony
prosecution, constitutes a "change of [that
person's] status" under state law. Paul, 424
U.S. at 712. Such action is quintessentially
"governmental in nature." McClary, 786
F.2d at 89 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, the presence
of such an alteration of the registrant's
legal rights and duties serves the
federalism-based function of the "plus"
factor: to ensure that the plaintiff cannot
convert a state-law defamation claim into
a 5 1983 action because of the mere
fortuity that he or she is suing a state
defendant. The injury that the plaintiff
alleges in this case -- stigma plus an
alteration in his or her state-law duties and
status -- could not have been inflicted by a
private person in a position analogous to
that of the state. Only a defendant
employing his or her "power as a state
official" could impose and enforce the
duties inherent in Connecticut's sexual
offender registry law and then publish the
information obtained by those state-
imposed duties. Id. (emphasis in original).
The defendants challenge the conclusion
that the Connecticut sexual offender law
satisfies the "plus" requirement on two
grounds. First, they allege that the
registration requirements constitute only a
"minimal burden" on registrants, an
intrusion no more onerous than that
which the federal and state tax laws
impose on all citizens and no more
inconvenient than the type of obligations
one encounters when completing census
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questionnaires or renewing a driver's
license. The notion that meeting the
burdens of the Connecticut registry law,
which we have described in some detail, is
comparable to paying taxes or complying
with census and driving registration
regulations is breathtaking. But in any
event, as we have explained, the
dispositive issue is neither the degree of
burden inherent in the proffered "plus"
factor nor the substantiality of the
interest, right, or status affected thereby.
Rather, at least when the governmental
action is not trivial, the inquiry turns on
the character of the action on which the
plaintiff seeks to establish the "plus"
component. Where, as here, that action is
"governmental in nature" -- a
characterization supported by the
defendants' comparison of the registration
requirements to other obligations only the
government can impose -- it constitutes a
"plus" factor that triggers constitutional
protection.
Second, the defendants argue that the
registration requirement's relation to the
stigma is too attenuated to constitute a
"plus" factor. The defendants point out
that the stigma arises not from the
registration requirement but rather from
the publication of the registration
information. They contend that the harm
of stigma and the additional tangible
burden of the "plus" factor must anise
from the same government act. In a
similar vein, the defendants point out that
a hearing permitting the plaintiff to
establish that he is not dangerous would
remedy only the stigma while leaving the
registration requirement intact. According
to the defendants, this demonstrates that
the "plus" factor in this case is
insufficient.
We are unpersuaded by this argument.
Our cases have not required the plaintiff
to seek a remedy for both the stigma and
the "plus" factor. [Citations omitted.] And
we have never required that the stigma
and the "plus" factor arise from a single
government act. Indeed, in the
government employment context, we
have required only a "concurrent temporal
link" between the separate acts of
termination and defamatory statements...
We think that the temporal nexus between
the stigma and the "plus" factor in this
case is sufficiently close to support a
liberty interest. The information published
by the State is obtained by means of the
registration requirement, and a person can
be stigmatized by publication of the
registry only if he or she is first subjected
to that requirement. The "plus" factor is
thus a necessary condition for the
stigmatization. Cf. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at
1002 (finding a liberty interest implicated
where the state's stigmatizing charges of
suspected child abuse were "coupled with
a statutory impediment mandating that
employers justify hiring" an individual so
charged).
III. Ex Post Facto Claim
[The court notes that Connecticut's
Megan's Law, while not intended to be
punitive, is punitive in fact and therefore
cannot survive the Pataki Ex Post Facto
test. Even so, the court refrained from
deciding on these grounds and only
affirmed the trial court's finding of a due
process violation.]
IV. The Injunction
We hold only that the plaintiff and the
members of the due process class are
entitled to the opportunity to have a
hearing consistent with due process
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principles to determine whether or not
they are particularly likely to be currently
dangerous before being labeled as such by
their inclusion in a publicly disseminated
registry. We make no judgment as to what
form that process should take. And we
make none as to what the State may do
once such a process is complete if,
pursuant thereto, a particular offender is
determined not to be currently dangerous
or as to whether or to what extent the
State may publicly disseminate
information about such an offender.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
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able to find work. Although the legislative intent of the Act was non-punitive, the Act
furthered the fundamental aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence - because
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completely unemployable. Because the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act increased the
punishment for sex offenses, the Ex Post Facto Clause requires the act be applied only to
those sex offenders whose crimes were committed after its enactment.
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REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
This case involves an extremely sensitive
and difficult question, both from a social
and legal standpoint. How may society
deal with convicted sex offenders after
they have been punished for their crimes?
How can society protect itself against
future offenses and at the same time
safeguard the constitutional rights of
persons who have fully paid the price
imposed by law for their crimes? The
issues treated in the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act we consider here differ
only in degree from a host of other issues
the citizens of this country regularly face
in trying to resolve the inherent tensions
between safety and freedom that exist in
any democracy.
The plaintiffs in this action are convicted
sex offenders who have completed their
sentences. They claim that Alaska's sex
offender registration and notification
statute, enacted after their convictions,
both constitutes an ex post facto law and
violates their due process rights. U.S.
Const. Article I, 5 10; Amend. 14. Because
we conclude that, as to defendants whose
crimes were committed before its
enactment, the Alaska statute violates the
Ex Post Facto Cause, we do not resolve
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the question whether it also violates the
Due Process Clause.
The Ex Post Facto Clause expresses our
commitment to constrain the manner in
which legislatures can address intense
fears of the type evoked by the return to
the community of convicted sex
offenders. However, its check on
legislative power is quite limited -- it
merely requires that punishment be
prospectively imposed. Because the
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
does not comply with this minimal
protection, we hold that it may not be
applied to persons whose crimes were
committed before its enactment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
On May 12, 1994, Alaska enacted the
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
(sometimes referred to in this opinion as
"the Act" or "the Alaska statute"), which
requires convicted sex offenders to
register with law enforcement authorities
and authorizes public disclosure of
information in the sex offender registry.
1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41. In its
implementing regulations, Alaska provides
that it will, in all cases, post the
information from the registry for public
viewing in print or electronic form, so that
it can be used by "any person" "for any
purpose." Alaska Admin. Code tit. 13, 5
09.050(a) (2000). Upon passage of the
Act, two men required to register, John
Doe I and John Doe II, as well as John
Doe I's wife, immediately brought a 42
U.S.C. 5 1983 action against the state
commissioner for public safety and state
attorney general to enjoin its enforcement.
In 1985, nine years before the Alaska
statute was enacted, Doe I had entered a
plea of nolo contendere to a charge of
sexual abuse of a minor after a court
determined that he had sexually abused
his daughter for two years while she was
between the ages of nine and eleven. He
was sentenced to twelve years
incarceration, of which four years were
suspended; he was released from prison in
1990. After being released, Doe I was
granted custody of his daughter, based on
a court's determination that he had been
successfully rehabilitated. In making its
determination, the court relied, in part, on
the findings of psychiatric evaluations
concluding that Doe I has "a very low risk
of re-offending" and is "not a pedophile."
Also, since his release, Doe I married Jane
Doe, who was aware of Doe I's
conviction for a sex offense.
Jane Doe is a registered nurse in
Anchorage, and is well known in the
medical community there. She alleges that
disclosure of her husband's criminal
background will "undermine [her]
professional relationships," and her ability
to obtain and care for patients.
The third plaintiff, John Doe II, entered a
plea of nolo contendere on April 8, 1984
to one count of sexual abuse of a minor
for sexual abuse of a 14-year-old child. He
was sentenced to eight years in prison,
released in 1990, and subsequently
completed a two-year program for the
treatment of sex offenders.
The Alaska statute has two main
components: it requires sex offender
registration, with criminal penalties for
failure to register, and it authorizes full
disclosure of information about all
offenders to the public. The registration
provisions require persons convicted of a
498
broad range of offenses against children
and adults to register in person with local
police authorities. Such offenses include,
for example, sexual assault and possession
of child pornography. Alaska Stat. $
12.63.100(1)(B)...
II. EX POST FACTO CLAIM
The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits states
from enacting any law that "changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the
crime, when committed." Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391, 1 L. Ed. 648
(1798). There is no question that the
Alaska statute, by its terms, applies to the
plaintiffs even though their crimes were
committed before its enactment...
Whether a statute should be classified as
imposing punishment involves a two-step
inquiry. We must first consider whether,
when enacting the Act, the Alaska
legislature "indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label or the
other." United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 248, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742, 100 S. Ct.
2636 (1980). If we conclude that the
legislature's intent was punitive, our
inquiry is at an end. Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169, 9 L. Ed. 2d
644, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963). If we conclude
that the legislature did not intend the
statute to be considered punitive, or that
its intent is ambiguous, then we must
inquire whether the statute is "so punitive
either in purpose or effect" that it should
be considered to constitute punishment.
Ward, 448 U.S. at 249. This two-step
inquiry is known as the "intent-effects
test." Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079,
1086 (9th Cir. 1997).
A. Intent of the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act
To determine the legislature's intent when
enacting the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act, we consider the body's
declared purpose, the structure of the
statute, and its design. Russell, 124 F.3d at
1087. Section 1 of the Alaska statute
states:
"The legislature finds that
(1) sex offenders pose a high risk of
reoffending after release from custody,
(2) protecting the public from sex
offenders is a primary governmental
interest,
(3) the privacy interests of persons
convicted of sex offenses are less
important than the government's interest
in public safety, and
(4) release of certain information about
sex offenders to public agencies and the
general public will assist in protecting
public safety."
1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, § 1.
The court in Patterson held that these
findings demonstrate that the legislature
viewed the Act as a measure designed to
accomplish a non-punitive purpose,
protecting the public through the
collection and release of information, and
we agree...
Thus, we now turn to the "effects" prong
to determine whether, notwithstanding
the legislative intent, the statute should be
treated as punitive for Ex Post Facto
Clause purposes.
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B. The Alaska Statute's Punitive Effect
When considering a statute's effect, we
rely on an analysis of seven factors set
forth by the Supreme Court in Mendoza-
Martinez. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087 They
are:
1) whether the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint;
2) whether it has historically
regarded as a punishment;
been
3) whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter;
4) whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment --
retribution and deterrence;
5) whether the behavior
applies is already a crime;
6) whether an alternative
which it may rationally be




7) whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
Here, the application of the seven factors
leads us to the conclusion that Alaska's
statute... is so punitive in its effect as to
offend the Ex Post Facto Cause.
1. Affirmative disability or restraint
The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
imposes an affirmative disability on the
plaintiffs. First, its registration provisions
impose a significant affirmative disability
by subjecting offenders to onerous
conditions that in some respects are
similar to probation or supervised
release... [Alaska's statute] requires sex
offenders such as the plaintiffs to re-
register at police stations four times each
year every year of their lives. Alaska Code
§ 12.63.010(d). Moreover, in order to do
so, they must appear in person at a police
station on each occasion, and provide,
under oath, a wide variety of personal
information, including address, anticipated
change of address, employer address,
vehicle description, and information
concerning mental health treatment for
any "mental abnormality or personality
disorder." 5 12.63.010(b).
Not only do the Alaska statute's
registration provisions impose an
affirmative disability, but its notification
provisions do so as well. By posting the
appellants' names, addresses, and
employer addresses on the internet, the
Act subjects them to community obloquy
and scorn that damage them personally
and professionally...
Considered as a whole, the Alaska
statute's registration and notification
provisions impose substantial disabilities
on the plaintiffs... When the applicable
provisions of the Alaska statute are
considered together, the first Mendoza-
Martinez factor clearly favors treating the
Act as punitive.
2. Historical treatment
Sex offender registration and notification
statutes are of fairly recent origin. Other
courts considering such statutes consider
whether they are analogous to historical
shaming punishments. In Russell, we
concluded that the provisions of the
Washington statute were not. Russell, 124
500
F.3d at 1092. We reach the same
conclusion here. Accordingly, the second
factor favors treating the statute as non-
punitive.
3. Finding of scienter
The third Mendoza-Martinez factor is
whether the statute's provisions come into
effect only upon a finding of scienter [...
While the Alaska statute generally requires
a finding of scienter, its provisions do not
become applicable only in such
circumstances. Accordingly, like the
second Mendoza-Martinez factor, this
factor supports the conclusion that the
Act is not punitive.]
4. Traditional aims of punishment
When a statute promotes the traditional
aims of punishment -- retribution and
deterrence, its effect is more likely to be
considered punitive. Id. This court has
previously held that Washington's statute,
which is substantially less onerous than
Alaska's, "may implicate deterrence,"
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091, and the
Patterson court reached the same
conclusion with regard to the Alaska
statute. Patterson, 985 P.2d at 1012.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Act
may provide a measure of deterrence; the
threat of being subjected to mandatory
registration and, particularly, publicly
branded a sex offender, may presumably
deter some persons who might otherwise
become offenders.
While the Alaska statute may have some
deterrent effect, it even more directly
serves the other traditional aim of
punishment -- retribution. It is primarily
this objective that causes us to weigh the
fourth factor on the side of finding the
Act punitive. The Act's onerous
registration obligations appear to be
inherently retributive...
Finally, that the length of the reporting
requirement appears to be measured by
the extent of the wrongdoing, not by the
extent of the risk posed, indicates that the
requirement is retributive. Those
convicted of "aggravated" sex offenses
must register four times each year for the
rest of their lives, while those convicted of
other sex offenses need only register
annually for a period of 15 years. See
Alaska Stat. 5 12.63.020(a)... This
difference appears clearly to be related to
the degree of wrongdoing, not the risk of
recidivism.
5. Applies to criminal behavior
That a statute applies only to behavior
that is already criminal is an additional
factor supporting the conclusion that its
effect is punitive. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 168. As the state concedes, the
Alaska statute applies only to those
"convicted" of specified offenses. Alaska
Stat. 5 12.63.100(5).
Unlike other states' sex offender
registration laws, the Alaska statute's harsh'
requirements can be imposed only on
individuals who have suffered an actual
criminal conviction in a court of law.
Thus, this factor also provides support for
the conclusion that the Act's effect is
punitive.
6. Non-punitive purpose
The appellants concede, as they must, that
there is a non-punitive purpose that can
rationally be connected to the Act. That
purpose, of course, is public safety, which
is advanced by alerting the public to the
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risk of sex offenders in their communities.
The existence of a non-puitive purpose
for the Alaska statute, protecting public
safety, unquestionably provides support,
indeed the principal support, for the view
that the statute is not punitive for Ex Post
Facto Clause purposes.
7. Excessiveness
The final, and, in this case, a highly
significant, factor in the Mendoza-
Martinez analysis is whether the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act "appears
excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned": public safety.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. The
appellants claim that the Act is excessive
in relation to its public safety purpose
because it is sweeping and overbroad in
several respects. They emphasize that the
scope of the statute is not limited to those
who the state determines pose a future
risk to the community. they point out
specifically that, once convicted, it does
not matter whether a defendant can prove
that he has been rehabilitated and that he
poses no threat of future criminal
conduct. Under the statute, a judicial
determination of rehabilitation (such as
made in Doe I's case) is irrelevant, and
even law enforcement authorities are
powerless to limit the widespread public
distribution of the injurious, and possibly
outdated, information that the statute
provides for.
With only one exception, every sex
offender registration and notification law
that has been upheld by a federal court of
appeals has tailored the provisions of the
statute to the risk posed by the offender.'
[Citations omitted.]
I The only exception to this rule is found in an
opinion that was filed after oral argument in this
In contrast, as we have noted, the Kansas
Supreme Court considered a sex offender
registration and notification statute that,
like the Alaska statute, allowed
unrestricted access to the registration
information regardless of risk. Kansas v.
Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041
(Kan. 1996). It concluded that the statute
had a punitive effect, and therefore was an
unconstitutional ex post facto law,
because it was "excessive and beyond that
necessary to promote public safety." 923
P.2d at 1043...
8. Conclusion
We conclude that the effects of the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act are
unquestionably punitive. The impact upon
the lives of those affected by the Act's
requirements is drastic indeed. The Act
imposes more substantial burdens on
those subject to its registration and
notification requirements than does any
legislation enacted by any other state, the
provisions of which have been considered
by a federal court of appeals.
In sum, the Mendoza-Martinez test leads
us to hold that the effects of the specific
provisions of the Alaska Act provide the
"clearest proof" that, notwithstanding the
case, Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.
2000). That case concerned the Utah sex offender
registration and notification statute, which, like the
Alaska statute, makes the state's entire sex
offender registry accessible on the internet. Id. at
1247-48. Unlike the Alaska statute, however, the
Utah database does not include employer names
and addresses, and thus does not place the sex
offenders' current employment in direct jeopardy.
See id. at 1247 (reciting information contained in
Utah database). In any event, we respectfully
disagree with the conclusions espoused by the
Tenth Circuit in Femedeer.
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legislature's non-punitive intent, the
statute must be classified as punitive for
Ex Post Facto Clause purposes.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. Four of the
seven factors favor this result.2
III. APPELLANTS' OTHER CLAIMS
[The court notes that their failure to
address the procedural and substantive
due process claims should not be viewed
as a commentary on their merit.]
IV. CONCLUSION
No one Mendoza-Martinez factor is
determinative, and excessiveness, standing
alone, would not be dispositive under the
Mendoza-Martinez test. Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 101, 139 L. Ed. 2d
450, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997). Still, we place
substantial weight on the fact that the Act
is far more sweeping than necessary to
serve the purpose of promoting public
safety. This is so not only with respect to
the undifferentiated scope of the Act but
also with respect to the severity of the
disabilities it imposes. Accordingly, we
conclude that, weighing all of the
Mendoza-Martinez factors together, the
effects of the Act provide the clearest
proof that it is punitive.
Because the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act increases the punishment
for sex offenses, the Ex Post Facto Clause
limits its application to those sex
offenders whose crimes were committed
after its enactment. California Dep't of
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504-05,
131 L. Ed. 2d 588, 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995).
Doe I was convicted in 1985, and Doe II
was convicted in 1984. The Alaska
legislature enacted the Act in 1994.
Therefore, the Alaska statute's application
to the appellants violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause.
2 We note that our conclusion is not based on a
simple equation in which each factor is given equal
weight. Rather, we consider the importance of
each factor in relation to the legislative scheme we
are exx uning.
We conclude that the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause. We therefore
REVERSE the district court's orders
granting summary judgment for the state
officials, and REMAND for further








The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday
to consider the constitutionality of so-
called Megan's laws, which publicize the
names and addresses of convicted sex
offenders.
The laws began sweeping the nation after
the rape and murder of Megan Kanka, a
7-year-old from New Jersey, by a
convicted sex offender in 1994.
A key question in a case from Connecticut
is whether states can put the names of sex
offenders on a registry without giving
them a hearing. A U.S. appeals court ruled
last year that due process of law requires
states to assess whether a person is a
danger to society and likely to repeat his
or her crimes.
The Supreme Court's decision to take
Connecticut's appeal sets up arguments
next fall that will pit state efforts to warn
communities that a predator might be in
their midst against the rights of convicts
who have served their time and want to
avoid new legal requirements and stigma.
A ruling is likely in 2003.
All 50 states have some version of
Megan's Law, but about half do not
require assessments of the risks posed by
those on the convict lists, the U.S. Justice
Department says.
Justice is siding with the Connecticut
Department of Public Safety in its appeal.
The U.S. government notes that its own
rules, which direct federal funds to states
that set up sex-offender databanks, do not
require a hearing before convicts' names
are included.
"It is not an exaggeration to state that the
constitutional question presented in this
case will impact directly upon the Megan's
laws of 50 states or upon the choices
those states have in further refining
existing Megan's laws," Connecticut
officials said in their petition.
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union lawyers,
representing an unidentified sex convict
who sued the state in 1999, say the state
law deprives the convict of reputation and
imposes legal obligations without a chance
to be heard.
Connecticut law requires sex offenders to
provide their names and addresses and
identifying information, such as
photographs and blood samples for DNA
analysis. The requirement lasts for 10
years, although those convicted of violent
sex offenses must register for life. A key
provision that has been suspended
because of the litigation requires the
public safety department to publicize
registrants' whereabouts on a Web site.
A U.S. appeals court ruled that
automatically putting all convicted sex
offenders on a registry without individual
hearings violates due process of law. It
found that the Web site, which says the
state "has made no determination that any
individual . . . is currently dangerous,"
suggests that some of those listed might
be dangerous.
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The Supreme Court said Tuesday that it
would decide whether sex offender
registration laws, intended to notify the
public of potential predators on children
in a community, can be applied to people
who committed their crimes before the
laws took effect.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear an
appeal from the state of Alaska of a lower-
court decision that said the state's version
of the so-called Megan's Law violates the
Constitution's protection against new
penalties being applied retroactively.
Twenty-four states signed a "friend of the
court" brief backing Alaska, telling the
justices that all states now have some
form of registration and community-
notification laws. Many of the registries
are posted on the Internet.
Such laws spread after the sexual assault
and murder in 1994 of 7-year-old Megan
Kanka in Hamilton, N.J. Her killer, who
lived across the street from the Kanka
family, had been convicted twice of sex
offenses, but the family was unaware of
his past.
If the lower court's reasoning in the
Alaska dispute were to become law, the
states say, it would hamper their ability to
notify the public about sex offenders.
The Alaska law, passed in 1994 and twice
amended, requires those convicted of
child kidnapping, abuse or sex offenses to
register their address, place of
employment and other personal data with
the state, which then makes the
information available to the public via the
Internet.
In finding that the law violates the
Constitution's e post facto clause, which
prohibits states from increasing penalties
for a crime beyond those on the books
when it was committed, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit cast the Alaska
law as more burdensome than other
statutes.
It said some offenders might have to
report four times a year to a police station,
and said the posting of the information on
the Internet exposes convicts to
widespread scorn.
Alaska officials say the purpose of the law
is not additional punishment but rather to
alert the public to potential threats. Its
appeal will be heard by the high court next
fall. A ruling is likely in 2003.
The justices also agreed to take up a
dispute closely watched by the publishing
industry over whether Congress had the
power to extend copyright protections for
authors and artists by 20 years.
The 1998 law was challenged by a group
of individuals and businesses that operate
Internet libraries and other services based
on works in the public domain. They say
the law violates the First Amendment and
the Constitution's copyright clause by
keeping songs, books and other elements
of "our common culture" from the public.
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Sloppy 'Megan's Laws' Hinder Goal of Boosting Public Safety
USA TODAY
May 12, 1998
Last month, three Wesleyan University
students, alerted by e-mail warnings,
spotted a convicted rapist wandering the
halls of their dormitory. He was promptly
arrested and charged with parole violation
-- a triumph for Connecticut's "Megan's
Law," which assures that neighbors are
warned when a sexual predator is released.
That is how people expect such laws to
work. But four years after the murder of
New Jersey 7-year-old Megan Kanka by a
released child molester, few work so well.
Every state has such a law, but in more
than half, there is no community
notification. Instead, people must call
state hot lines or dial up Internet sites and
submit names of people they suspect.
Many other states err in the other
direction. Notification encompasses such
a broad range of sex crimes that they
create more panic than protection. And
virtually every state has passed laws with
little or no funding.
The result is a mishmash of programs that
do far less to protect the public than they
could, while raising numerous problems
that needn't exist, such as discouraging the
reporting of some sex crimes, distracting
public attention from more dangerous
defendants, stigmatizing some who might
otherwise return to a law-abiding life and
opening states to lawsuits.
Louisiana, for example, includes incest
among cnmes requiring notification, even
though those guilty of incest pose almost
no danger to the wider community.
Notification can include having offenders'
pictures published in local newspapers.
As a result, prosecutors report that teen-
age girls are less willing to turn in family
members who molest them for fear their
friends will find out, according to a
National Criminal Justice Association
study.
Statutory rape and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor are other crimes
confusing the Louisiana law.
California was even sloppier in its version
of "Megan's Law."
It put the names of 64,000 sex offenders
on a CD-ROM and made it available to
the public. The list of names included
dead people and dozens of homosexuals
who were rounded up in police sweeps of
gays in the 1940s and 1950s. In addition,
nearly two-thirds of the addresses and
ZIP codes given for offenders were
wrong.
The spread of the information, including
dissemination at the California State Fair,
embarrassed many who had become
family men. It also led police in some
jurisdictions to waste their time tracking
down many minor offenders rather than
keeping tabs on truly dangerous predators.
The law finally was changed last fall to
make it easier for men convicted of
homosexual acts to remove their names
from the files. The state, though, still can't
guarantee that the information it provides
is accurate, a real problem considering
that a New Jersey man was beaten up in
his home by a neighbor who'd been
inaccurately notified that a sex offender
lived there.
508
Ironically, the state that seems to have
struck the right balance is one that acted
four years before Megan's murder.
Washington state enacted its "Megan's
Law" in 1990, after a brutal sex crime by a
sexual predator there. The law has three
key components:
-- It limits community notification to
offenders most likely to endanger the
community. Thus, communities are
notified about only the 11% of paroled
sex offenders who pose the greatest
threat. Schools and certain other
community organizations receive notice
about less dangerous offenders. Local
police are told about all offenders. This
tiering of sex crimes keeps the focus on
the most dangerous offenders where it
belongs.
-- It encourages education. While
notification may take place by flier, three-
fifths of communities have police go door
to door, and half hold community
meetings. This allows authorities not only
to inform people about the pattern a
particular offender follows but also to
increase awareness about other sexual
crimes. And people are directly warned
against harassing a paroled offender. The
state learned early to issue such warnings
after an offender's home was burned
down. Since 1993, even verbal harassment
has been rare.
-- Finally, unlike other states, Washington
evaluates the effectiveness of its program.
One important study found that while
recidivism rates didn't change with
notification (about one in five were
returned to prison), those rearrested were
caught three years earlier on average. That




Ultimately, it is that kind of protection
that "Megan's Laws" are supposed to be
about.
Wesleyan University students were able to
protect themselves from a dangerous
predator last month because they knew
about him -- and because they weren't
inundated by information that would have
rendered the warning meaningless.
That doesn't seem so hard. It just requires
that legislators hungry to attract votes by
attacking crime think before they act.
Getting the word out
All states require convicted sex offenders
to register with law enforcement agencies.
The agencies must notify schools, day-
care centers and parents that offenders are
in their area. Degrees of public
notification:
* States that provide information to the
general public -Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington
state and Wyoming.
* Provided to individuals and
organizations at risk -- Arkansas,
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
West Virginia and Wisconsin.
* Available on request -- Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Mississippi,
Michigan, Ohio, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Utah and Virginia.
* Restricted to law enforcement agencies -
Kentucky, Nebraska and New Mexico.
Copyright @ 1998 Gannett Company, Inc.
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Virginia Doyle's 6-year-old was emptying
out his backpack the other day -- hockey
team schedules, fliers from school clubs,
lunch menus -- when out came a sealed,
official-looking envelope that he handed
her with purpose. "They said to make sure
you see this," he said.
Doyle expected to find a letter from a
teacher or perhaps a report card when she
pulled out what resembled a wanted
poster saying, "SEX OFFENDER
RELEASE NOTICE," in inch-high
letters. Underneath were a photograph,
name and description of a convicted sex
offender living near her children's school.
Even before the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision Feb. 23 to let stand New Jersey's
"Megan's Law," the template for sex-
offender notification statutes in effect in
47 states, authorities here and nationally
began moving aggressively to alert
communities to sex offenders in their
midst -- and tapping an ever-expanding
array of communications networks to do
so.
As a result, thousands of children, parents,
employers, landlords and neighbors find
themselves in a new, information-
drenched world in which names of sex
offenders are being delivered to their
front doors by police, posted on the
Internet, e-mailed across campuses,
displayed on telephone poles, published in
newspapers and, in New Jersey's latest
variation on the theme, sent home like a
report card in a child's backpack.
Differences in laws from one state to the
next are raising widely varying issues --
from Louisiana, where newspapers are
required to publish photographs of
released child sex offenders, to New
Jersey, where residents are explicitly
warned of prosecution for leaking notices
to the press.
At the Doyle household 25 miles east of
Philadelphia, the entry into this new world
went fairly smoothly, despite warnings
from the law's critics that it will incite
panic and vigilantism. Doyle said she and
her three children sat down for a long,
difficult talk about 7-year-old Megan
Kanka of central New Jersey, the law's
namesake, who was kidnapped, raped and
murdered in 1994 by a released sex
offender who had moved in across the
street.
Doyle and several other parents
interviewed said they welcome the chance
to reinforce safety precautions with
children. "I feel more comfortable,
knowing theyll be aware," Doyle said. But
several said they would have been
horrified if children had read the notices
on their own.
New Jersey is one of 18 states sending
pictures and addresses of all high-risk sex
offenders directly to area homes and
businesses, usually via police officers.
In other states, notification is more
passive. In California, for example,
residents can go to sheriffs' offices and
view a data base of more than 60,000 sex
offenders by zip code. In New York, a
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900 number soon will offer residents
information for $ 5 on sex offenders
living nearby. Florida, Kansas, Alaska,
Indiana, Georgia, Michigan and Oregon
have World Wide Web sites with
offenders' names, addresses and photos.
In Maryland, people and organizations are
notified only as authorities deem
necessary. In Virginia, access to offender
information is limited, but the legislature
is moving to establish a Web site. The
District is still formulating a notification
system
New Jersey passed its Megan's Law in
October 1994, four months after Megan's
murder, and in 1996 Congress passed a
federal version requiring states to pass
sex-offender notification laws or risk
losing federal law enforcement money.
Only Kentucky, New Mexico and
Nebraska have yet to enact laws, but
legislatures there are considering them.
New Jersey's system, revised by several
court rulings, is unique, according to Todd
Mitchell of the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children in
Arlington, Va., because it joins the most
aggressive notification technique with the
most aggressive privacy protections for
offenders.
The unusual combination reflects the
collision of a powerful parents' right-to-
know movement with a state supreme
court long known as a civil liberties
bastion. It requires that notifications go
only to those "likely to encounter" high-
risk offenders. Notices are hand-delivered
by police to homes and businesses in a
court-approved radius -- from a few
blocks to two miles -- but also are sent
outside it to parents whose children attend
school within it.
Offenders designated by prosecutors as
"high risk" -- which triggers a door-to-
door notification -- or "moderate risk" can
challenge the designation before a judge,
as well as the scope of the notification.
Moreover, every notice comes complete
with warnings that anyone who leaks them
to the press or even "beyond your
immediate household" could be
prosecuted.
The limits already have raised First
Amendment questions. In January, the
Home News Tribune in East Brunswick,
N.J., published a front-page picture and
article on the first sex offender in the area
whose neighbors were notified. Local
prosecutors immediately launched an
investigation to find the leak, so far
without result, and Attorney General
Peter Verniero summoned newspaper
executives to warn against "abuse" of the
law.
"After all the court challenges we've had, I
felt they could have jeopardized our law,"
said Maureen Kanka, Megan's mother,
who also spoke out.
The Home News Tribune stood firm.
"Megan and Megan's Law are huge stories
in New Jersey, and this was the first
notification and in our opinion that made
it news," said managing editor Teresa
Klink. "We take the position it is not up
to prosecutors to decide what news is.
That's what editors are for."
More recently, WPVI-TV of Philadelphia
obtained a leaked notice about the
Pemberton Township flier and aired it
Feb. 25.
The experience here is significant because
the Center for Missing and Abused
Children, which helped the Kanka family
campaign for notification laws, views New
Jersey's law here as "a model for other












Critics of the laws say, however, that the
incidents here raise questions about
whether the balancing act can work.
"How do you have a uniformed officer
show up at the door to tell people about a
high-risk person and then say, 'Don't let
us catch you talking to the press or
neighbors'? " asked Ed Martone of the
American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey. "I think we're in the early stages of
seeing this just isn't something
government can do."
A Pemberton mother, who insisted on
anonymity for fear of being prosecuted
for even talking to a reporter, said she
supports Megan's Law but feels "very
uneasy about this order not to talk. So
much has changed since I was a child.
You never locked doors; now you lock
every door. Maybe this is just something
else we have to learn to live with."
The New Jersey system is proving to be
extremely labor-intensive. All 21 New
Jersey counties have a "Megan's Unit" in
the prosecutor's office to coordinate
registering released offenders, assessing
their risk, litigating their court challenges
to risk rankings and notification plans and
then overseeing police, schools and
community leaders who disseminate
notices.
"We have a five-person unit, three
lawyers, a detective and a secretary, and
this is all we do, full time," said assistant
Union County prosecutor Maureen
O'Brien in central New Jersey.
Copyright c 1998 The Washington Post
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Adding to his election-year defense of his
record on crime, President Clinton today
signed legislation that requires telling
neighbors when sex offenders move in.
The measure is called "Megan's law,"
named for a slain New Jersey youngster.
Surrounded by families who have lost
children to violence, Clinton said, "The
law named for one child is now for every
child." He said the new law will "tell a
community when a dangerous sexual
predator enters its midst. There is no
greater right than the right to raise
children in peace and safety."
The bill was passed by the House earlier
this month 418-0.
The measure strengthens requirements in
the 1994 crime bill by requiring states not
only to notify local law enforcement
officials when a convicted sex offender
moves into a neighborhood but also to
make that information available to the
commurnty.
The bill was sponsored by Rep. Dick
Zimmer (R-N.J.) following the 1994 rape
and murder of Megan Kanka, a 7-year-old
New Jersey girl. A convicted sex offender
who lived across the street from her --
whose record was unknown to the Kanka
family -- was charged with the crime.
Standing near Clinton in the Oval Office
as he signed the bill were Megan's parents,
Richard and Maureen Kanka, and their
daughter, Jessica, 13, and son, Jeremy, 10.
Also present were Marc Klaas, whose 12-
year-old daughter, Polly, was kidnapped
from her bedroom in Petaluma, Calif., and
murdered in 1989; and Patty Wetterling,
whose son, Jacob, was kidnapped from his
home in St. Joseph, Minn., in 1989 and
has never been found.
Clinton said all three families have worked
to protect other children from the
violence that claimed theirs.
"They have suffered more than any parent
should ever have to," Clinton said. "And
they took up the cause of all families and
all children."
"This gives parents the information every
parent has the right to know, which is
whether there is somebody who can hurt
their children living in their
neighborhood," Zimmer said in an
interview Thursday.
"It's a common-sense workable way to
reduce the incidence of crime," he said.
"It is Megan Kanka's legacy, and is a real
legacy for her parents . . . who
experienced the worst thing that can
happen to any parents."
States could lose federal aid if they fail to
comply with the terms of the law, but they
will be allowed to decide how dangerous
an offender is and what type of
notification is required.
The initial version of the law is under
challenge in a U.S. District courtroom in
New Jersey, where a judge has barred
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Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals
The New York Times
November 1, 1994
Joseph F. Sullivan
Convicted sex offenders in New Jersey
will now be subject to lifetime supervision
under a package of laws signed today by
Gov. Christine Todd Whitman. Critics,
particularly civil libertarians, say that the
bills, among the nation's toughest, contain
more symbolism than substance and are
heading for a certain constitutional
challenge.
Even as she signed the nine-bill package,
known as Megan's Law, Mrs. Whitman
acknowledged that keeping a tight rein on
sex offenders after they have completed
their sentences presents legal problems.
But she added: "It would be hollow justice
if we wrote laws to protect families and
communities only to have those laws
struck down in the courts. I am confident
this package will pass constitutional
muster." The Governor also warned that
"government cannot legislate away the
problem of sexual offenses."
The legislation was spurred by the sexual
assault and killing last July 29 of Megan
Kanka, a 7-year-old from Hamilton. Jesse
K. Timmendequas, a twice-convicted sex
offender who lived across the street from
Megan's family, has been charged with the
killing.
Megan's parents and neighbors, who were
not aware of Mr. Timmendequas's sex
convictions, urged New Jersey lawmakers
to require the authorities to notify
communities when a child-sex offender
moved in.
The bills, signed at a ceremony attended
by the young girl's parents and the parents
of another young sex-crime victim, have
already had an impact far beyond New
Jerseys borders. When President Clinton
lobbied for the Federal crime bill last
summer, he mentioned Megan and the
need for a community-notification
provision. That provision is now part of
Federal law.
The New Jersey bills go even further than
the Federal law, which also establishes a
registry of sex offenders. The New Jersey
package would require sex offenders to
provide blood for genetic testing and a
DNA database. They would also have to
submit to lifetime community supervision,
similar to parole, and involuntary hospital
commitment if they are judged by the
authorities to be dangerous.
Representative Richard A. Zimmer,
Republican of New Jersey, said the new
Federal law required all states to enact
such statutes within three years or lose
some Federal funds.
A handful of states have already struck
down community notification statutes as
unconstitutional. The executive director
of the American Civil Liberties Union of
New Jersey, Edward Martone, said that
courts in five states -- California, Illinois,
Arizona, New Hampshire and Alaska --
had struck down the laws. But the
registries, which enable the police to track
sex offenders' whereabouts, have been
upheld in those states, he said.
Washington is the only state that has
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upheld both a registry and a modified
community-notification law pertaining to
violent and repeat offenders. "Only 5
percent of the sex offenders would be
affected" by such a community-
notification law, Mr. Martone said.
Mr. Martone, who called the package
"more symbolic than substantial," said
that the retroactive nature of the registry
left it open to challenge, adding that the
A.C.L.U. would test the New Jersey laws
in court. He noted that a committee of the
New Jersey State Bar Association had
recently opposed both registration and
community notification on privacy
grounds.
"What really is needed is quality treatment
and education while the offender is
incarcerated and the creation of facilities
and programs to continue treatment and
supervision after release," he said.
"Unfortunately, New Jersey doesn't offer
any of these things."
John S. Furlong, a lawyer from West
Trenton, said he was planning to
challenge the registry law because it
applied to everyone ever convicted of a
sex crime, even those convicted before
the law was enacted.
"My primary class of clients are guys who
pleaded guilty many years ago, went to jail,
sought and received treatment and were
released and have had no other contact
with the system, " he said. "That class of
citizen should not have to register under
the new law."
In her remarks, Mrs. 'Whitman said she
recognized the need for education and
treatment and acknowledged that none of
the bills includes any money for such
programs. She said she would include an
unspecified amount of money for them in
next year's budget despite her efforts to
cut spending. "This is too important," she
said.
"Let these bills remind us that our work is
just beginning," the Governor said. "We
have to make Megan's Law work And we
must honor the spirit of this legislation by
getting to the root causes of the problem -
by stressing prevention and early
intervention and pursuing education and
treatment before tragedy strikes."
Megan's mother, Maureen Kanka, said she
was heartened by the outpouring of
support from families across the country
after her daughter's death. "When good
people come together for the right
reasons, they can accomplish anything,"
she said.
She said she was pleased by the new bills,
but said that if the bills had been in place
years ago her daughter might still be alive.
People touched by the photograph of a
smiling Megan that often accompanied
news accounts of the case have sent
money to the Kankas, who have
established a foundation to promote
enactment of similar laws in other states.
The Hamilton Township Rotary Club is
collecting money to buy and raze the
house across the street from the Kankas
where Mr. Timmendequas lived. Mrs.
Kanka said that looking at the house every
day was a traumatic experience for her
family, and that she would be glad to see it
destroyed. Mayor Jack Rafferty of
Hamilton said that the township planned
to turn the property into a small park in
Megan's memory.
Karen Wengert, the mother of 6-year-old
Amanda Wengert of Manalapan
Township, who was sexually assaulted and
killed in March, also spoke briefly. The
neighbor charged in Amanda's killing had
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a record of sex abuse as a juvenile, but
those records were closed under state law.
"We need to change our juvenile justice
laws and to get tough on juveniles," she
said. "A juvenile criminal right now
becomes an adult criminal later because
we just slap them on the wrist and let
them go."
SORTING IT OUT
'Megan's Law' and More
A package of legislation dealing with sex
offenders was signed into law yesterday by
Gov. Christine Todd Whitman. One
measure, which has become known as
"Megan's Law," requires the police to
provide notification to a neighborhood,
nearby schools and other institutions
when a convicted sex offender intends to
move in. It is named for 7-year-old Megan
Kanka of Hamilton, who was killed this
summer.
Here is a summary of what each of the
other bills would do:
-- Establishes longer, minimum prison
terms for violent sex offenses against
victims under age 16, including the
possibility of life without parole.
-- Makes murder of a child under age 15
an aggravating factor adequate for a jury
to consider the death penalty.
-- Requires convicted sex offenders,
including those convicted before prior to
the implementation of this law, to report
their address to local police or to state
authorities every 90 days. The police must
periodically verify the items in the notice.
-- Eliminates prison-sentence reductions,
known as "good behavior credits," for
inmates at the state treatment center for
sex offenders, the Adult Diagnostic and
Treatment Center at Avenel, if they do
not participate in psychotherapy or
treatment.
-- Expands the powers of the attorney
general and county prosecutors to seek
civil confinement in psychiatric hospitals
for sex offenders who are about to be
released from prison.
-- Requires lifetime supervision for sex
offenders as part of any conviction, which
makes it possible for parole officers to
track them after normal prison and parole
terms would expire.
-- Requires convicted sex offenders to
provide blood samples to allow a DNA
record to be kept for future investigations.
As with community notification, this law
applies to offenders who have been
convicted in the past, who must provide
blood samples prior to release from
prison.
-- Makes it a law that the Department of
Corrections notify county prosecutors 30
days in advance when a sex offender from
their jurisdiction is coming out of prison.
The department has been doing this since
1989 as a matter of policy. Law also
requires prosecutors to inform police and
victim advocate agencies.
The Legislature also passed a special
resolution establishing an investigative
task force to study the treatment of sex
offenders at Adult Diagnostic and
Treatment Center, and to recommend
changes. This resolution did not require
the Governor's signature.







































Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
(01-6487, 01-6504)
~~~~~~ Proceedings and Orders- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Application (AG 1-702) for a stay of execution pending the disposition
of a petition for a writ of certiorari, submitted to Justice
Stevens.
Petition for writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis filed. (Response due April 18, 2002)
Brief of respondent in opposition filed.
Response to application (A01-702) filed by Ricky Bell, Warden.
Reply brief of petitioner filed.
Supplemental brief of petitioner filed.
Application (AO 1-702) referred to the Court by Justice Stevens.
Application (AO 1-702) granted by the Court.
REDISTRIBUTED for Conference of April 12, 2002
REDISTRIBUTED for Conference of April 19, 2002
Petition GRANTED. limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the
petition.
SET FOR ARGUMENT November 6,2002.
Order extending time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's
brief on the merits to and including June 27, 2002.
Order further extending time to file the joint appendix and
petitioner's brief on the merits to and including July 10, 2002.
Consent to the filing of all amicus briefs in support of either
party received from counsel for the petitioner.
Brief amicus curiae of National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers filed.
Brief amici curiae of Former Prosecutors James F. Neal, et al. filed.
Joint appendix filed.
Brief of petitioner Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman filed.
Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel filed.
Order extending time to file respondent's brief on the merits to
and including September 12, 2002.
CIRCULATED.
Motion DISTRIBUTED. September 30, 2002 (Page 162)
Brief amici curiae of Alabama, et al. filed.
Brief of respondent Ricky Bell, Warden filed.















Goldstein & Howe PC 2022377594
4607 Asbury Pl. NW
Washington, DC 20016
Assistant Attorney General 6155327357
425 Fifth Ave., North
Nashville, TN 37243
Other Attorneys:
Deanne E. Maynard 601 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
Party name: National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
hbeth G. Taylor 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036




Party name: Alabama, et al.
Sidley Austin Brown Wood
1501 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
2027368000
Kent S. Scheidegger Criminal Justice Legal Fdn.
2131 L Street
Sacramento, CA 95816
Party name: Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
9164460345
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/O 1-9094.htm
Page 2 of 2
01-9094 Abdur'Rahman v. Bell
Ruling Below: (Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, 6 Cir., 226 F.3d 696, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis
22978, 2000 Fed App. 0319P)
The court held that Abdur'Rahman was not prejudiced at his trial by the deficient
performance of his counsel during death penalty sentencing, because the state court found
that although his counsel did not investigate to obtain information about his mental health
and background, the information that would have been brought forth would not have
benefited Abdur'Rahman. The court denied him a writ of habeas corpus.
Question Presented: Should a criminal defendant whose lawyer was found to have
performed deficiently during death penalty sentencing by not providing evidence of
mitigating background and mental health evidence be granted a writ of habeas corpus if the
state court found that this deficiency did not prejudice the defendant?
Abu-Ali ABDUR'RAHMAN, Petitioner-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant,
V.
Ricky BELL, Warden, Respondent-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Decided September 13, 2000.
SILER, Circuit Judge:
Respondent, Ricky Bell, Warden ("State"),
appeals the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus to Petitioner, Abu-Ali
Abdur'Rahman ("Petitioner"), vacating
Petitioner's sentence of death for first-
degree murder on the grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel at the
sentencing phase of Petitioner's trial.
Additionally, Petitioner cross-appeals the
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus seeking relief from his conviction
for first-degree murder. We reverse the
district court's finding that Petitioner was
prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient
performance at the sentencing stage and
vacate the portion of the district court's
judgment granting the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus as to the death sentence.
Additionally, we affirm the portion of the
district court's judgment denying the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to
the conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
[Abdur'Rahman was convicted of
first-degree murder for which he was
sentenced to death. The death penalty
was imposed based on jury finding that he
had previously committed a felony, the
murder was especially cruel, and it was
committed while he was engaged in
another serious crime.
Abdur'Rahman entered the home of a
man from whom he had bought marijuana
under the pretext of buying drugs. Armed
with a shotgun, he bound the man and his
girlfriend, robbed them, then stabbed
both with a butcher knife, killing the man
and wounding his girlfriend.
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Abdur'Rahman argued at trial that he was
motivated by his membership in a "quasi-
religious paramilitary group" that sought
to cleanse the black community of
undesirable elements.
His first lawyer ceased representation
because of the possibility that the leader
of the religious group, who was paying the
legal fees, was involved with the crime.
His second lawyer did not inquire about
the source of the fees, but refused to do
any work because the full retainer had not
been paid. Abdur'Rahman claims this
lead to ineffective representation because
the lawyer failed to investigate, present
potentially exculpatory evidence, or
present mitigating evidence during
sentencing.
On appeal, his conviction was affirmed
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorani.]
II. DISCUSSION
A. State's Appeal Challenging the
Judgment Granting the Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus as to the Death
Sentence
[Even though the district court erred in
not giving a presumption of correctness to
the findings of the post-conviction court,
this error did not require a remand
because the district court properly ordered
an evidentiary hearing and properly
considered that evidence pursuant to its
discretionary powers.]
[3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel]
The post-conviction trial court concluded
that Petitioner's trial counsel's
performance was deficient during the
sentencing phase due to the failure to
investigate and obtain information about
Petitioner's background and mental
health. However, it went on to hold that
Petitioner suffered no prejudice at the
sentencing stage because the evidence that
he would have offered to support a
finding of mitigating circumstances was
both helpful and harmful and that it
would not have been a prudent strategy to
present the evidence.
Stridland set forth the test for determining
when the ineffective assistance of counsel
so prejudices a defendant that his
sentence must be set aside. First, "any
deficiencies in counsel's performance
must be prejudicial to the defense in order
to constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel under the Constitution."
St7iland, 466 U.S. at 692. "The defendant
must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different
[... ]" Id. at 694.
The post-conviction trial court found that
Petitioner did not suffer any prejudice
from the deficient performance, a holding
that the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed:
If the trial attorneys had investigated
further, they would have found that the
appellant had a long history of violent
behavior and anti-social personality
disorders. We agree with the trial judge's
finding that trial counsel were ineffective
in failing to further investigate the
background of the accused under the
circumstances, but we also agree with Mr.
Barrett's testimony and the trial judge's
conclusion that it probably would not
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have been the most prudent trial strategy
to use proof of appellant's history of
violent behavior and anti-social
personality disorders at either the guilt or
innocence phase or at the sentencing
phase of the trial.
Petitioner did not suffer prejudice
sufficient to create a reasonable
probability that the sentencing jury would
have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating factors did not
warrant death. Thus, the decision of the
district court that Petitioner was
prejudiced at the sentencing stage due to
his counsel's deficient performance is
reversed.
4. Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel
Instruction
[The court found that vagueness
challenges to jury instructions in death
penalty sentencing are analyzed under the
Eighth Amendment, which requires that
juries are not left with open-ended
discretion, but rather are adequately
informed as to what must be found to
impose death.]
We decline to pass on the constitutionality
of the instruction in this case because any
error therein was harmless. "Whenever an
aggravating factor has been invalidated in
a weighing state, the sentence must be
reweighed or analyzed for harmless error
if the sentence is to be affirmed." Coe,
161 F.3d at 334.
*
"We turn, therefore, to analyze this error
for harmfulness. The question we must
ask is whether the error "had substantial
and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict." [Id], 161
F.3d at 334-35. In Coe, the error was
deemed harmless because the jury made
the narrow finding that "the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and
involved torture," when it had been
charged to find that the murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in
that it involved torture or depravity of
mind." Ict at 335.
Unfortunately, the jury's verdict form in
the instant case was not preserved.
However, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee made the factual finding that
the jury had found the three aggravating
circumstances as set forth above in the
Background section. See State v Jones,
789 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Tenn. 1990). These
factual findings are accorded the
presumption of correctness under 28
U.S.C. 5 2254(d)[... ]
As the State correctly points out, there
was ample evidence to support the
aggravating circumstances that Petitioner
had been previously convicted of one or
more felonies involving the use or threat
of violence to the person and that the
instant murder was committed while the
Petitioner was engaged in committing, or
attempting to commit, any first degree
murder or robbery. See State v Jones, 789
S.W.2d at 550. [... ] Thus, even if the
heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator is
removed form the calculus, there is no
mitigating evidence to weigh against the
remaining prior felony conviction and
felony murder aggravators. Therefore the
error was harmless in that it did not have
a substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict.
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5. Petitioner's Unanimity Objection to
the Sentencing Instructions
[The court found that the lack of
instruction specifically stating that the jury
did not have to unanimously find
mitigating circumstances would not lead
jurors to believe the opposite.]
B. Petitioner's Cross-Appeal
Challenging the Denial of his Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Corpus as to his
Conviction
On cross-appeal, Petitioner argues that
the district court's conclusion that he
suffered no prejudice from his trial
counsel's deficient performance at the
guilt stage was erroneous. First, Petitioner
argues that due to his trial counsel's
conflict of interest and wholly inadequate
representation, prejudice can be presumed
and therefore need not be shown. Second,
Petitioner argues that he did in fact suffer
prejudice by trial counsel's delay in
preparing for his trial, by the failure to
present forensic evidence, and by the
failure to present evidence concerning
Petitioner's mental history. In response,
the State argues that there was no actual
conflict of interest and that Petitioner
suffered no prejudice because he cannot
show a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been
different in the absence of trial counsel's
deficient performance.
[1. Conflict of Interest]
Petitioner fails to show that his trial
counsel was actively representing
conflicting interests. At most, Petitioner's
tnal counsel delayed the preparation of his
case for too long in anticipation of
receiving the balance of his retainer fee.
Though Petitioner argues that he was
adversely affected by the conflict of
interest, he does not allege that his trial
counsel was actively representing
conflicting interests. Additionally,
Petitioner could not make such a showing
because as the district court noted, "even
if Mr. Boyd's interests were adverse to
Petitioner, Mr. Barrett certainly did not
protect the interests of SEGM or Mr.
Boyd during the trial and sentencing."
Abdur'Rahman, 999 F. Supp. at 1091. The
district court noted that Barrett elicited
testimony about the SEGM from Beard
on cross-examination, mentioned the
Petitioner's connection with the group
during his closing argument, and issued
subpoenas for Boyd and Beard to appear
at the trial. Thus, it cannot be said that
Barrett was actively representing
conflicting interests.
2. Prejudice
Petitioner argues that the district court
erred in concluding that he did not suffer
any prejudice by his trial counsel's
deficient performance of delaying his
preparation for trial, by the failure to
present forensic evidence, and by the
failure to present evidence concerning
Petitioner's mental history.
First, Petitioner argues that Barrett's
decision not to work on the case until he
received the balance of the retainer
prejudiced him by the lack of any
meaningful work being performed and by
depriving him of representation during his
psychological evaluation. However,
Petitioner points to no specific evidence
that would raise a reasonable probability
that the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt in the
absence of this delay.
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Second, Petitioner argues that he was
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to
investigate and present a lab report
showing that no blood was found on the
clothes he was allegedly wearing during
the offense. The district court correctly
held that such evidence would not have
created a reasonable doubt about guilt
because although there was testimony that
Petitioner was wearing a long dark coat on
the night of the offense, there was no
evidence that at the time of the homicide
Petitioner was wearing the clothes seized
later from his apartment. See
Abdur'Rahman, 999 F. Supp. at 1096.
Finally, Petitioner argues that trial
counsel's failure to investigate his mental
history, especially his diagnoses of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Borderline
Personality Disorder, prejudiced him at
the guilt stage of his trial. The district
court held that this was not prejudicial
because there was no evidence that
Petitioner could have produced an expert
to testify that he was insane at the time of
the stabbings, or even if one did so testify
that testimony would have been
effectively countered by evidence from
the Middle Tennessee Mental Health
Institute from an examination authorized
prior to trial that there was no basis for
Petitioner to invoke an insanity defense.
[ ... I
III. CONCLUSION
The district court's finding of prejudice at
the sentencing stage is REVERSED and
the judgment granting the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus as to Petitioner's
death sentence is VACATED. The district
court's judgment denying the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus as to Petitioner's
conviction is AFFIRMED.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, R GUY
COLE, JR, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part:
[The concurrence agreed with the majority
opinion except on the issue of the
properness of the evidentiary hearing
granted by the habeas court. The federal
court did not have the discretion to retry
the state court decision.]
COLE, JR, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part, dissenting in part:
Because I would affirm the district court's
determination that Abdur'Rahman's
counsel was constitutionally ineffective at
sentencing and that the writ should be
granted as to this issue, I respectfully
dissent from that portion of Judge Siler's
opunon.
Abdur'Rahman's counsel was
constitutionally ineffective at sentencing
due to counsel's utter failure to investigate
or present available mitigating evidence.
In order to prove ineffective assistance of
counsel, Abdur'Rahman must fulfill the
familiar two-prong requirement of
Stnkland u Washiton, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
First, the defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so senous as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. [... ] As noted by
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the majority, we review this mixed
question of law and fact de novo. See Id
at 698; McQueen v Scrqgy, 99 F.3d 1302,
1311 (6th Cir. 1996).
The district court and both Tennessee
post-conviction courts that examined this
case determined that Abdur'Rahman's
counsel's performance was deficient. The
state does not challenge this
determination.
The majority suggests that [. . defense
counsel could have made a legitimate
tactical decision not to present the
evidence, which is now in the record but
was not presented to the jury, and that we
should defer to this decision.
Unfortunately, defense counsel's "tactical
decision" in this case was to not prepare
for the capital sentencing hearing of their
client. "Our case law rejects the notion
that a 'strategic' decision can be reasonable
when the attorney has failed to investigate
his options and make a reasonable choice
between them." Horton u Zant, 941 F.2d
1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991).
Further, and more importantly, I disagree
with the majority's finding that
Abdur'Rahman was not prejudiced by
counsel's failure. To demonstrate
prejudice, Abdur'Rahman "must show
that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Strikland,
466 U.S. at 694. He need not show that
counsel's performance more likely than
not affected the outcome of the case. See
Id. at 693-94. Instead, "when a defendant
challenges a death sentence . . ., the
question is whether there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer- including an appellate court, to
the extent it independently reweighs the
evidence would have concluded that the
balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death." Id
at 696.
Counsel's failure to investigate or properly
prepare for sentencing resulted in the
presentation of essentially no mitigating
evidence to the jury at the sentencing
phase. Despite counsel's assertion in his
opening statement that he would put on
other witnesses, Abdur'Rahman and his
wife were the sole witnesses at sentencing
and their testimony related to the
circumstances of the offense for which he
was found guilty. It did not address
Abdur'Rahman's history of abuse, his
mental health treatment, or other relevant
aspects of his life. This is so despite the
fact that the jury should "'not be
precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."' Pery Lymaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 317, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 109
S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (quoting Lockett u Oio,
438 U.S. 586, 604, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 98 S.
Ct. 2954 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
[The dissent enumerates the mitigating
evidence.]
While acknowledging that some of this
evidence would have been mitigating, the
majority adopts the rationale of the state
court of appeals that the evidence that
defense counsel failed to investigate or
present also contained instances of violent
conduct and anti-social actions by
Abdur'Rahman. This treatment of the
evidence by the majority contradicts the
emphasis by the courts that evidence
considered mitigating by the person facing
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a death sentence should be allowed to the
greatest extent possible to insure a full and
fair determination by the jury. See, e.g.,
Eddings u Cklahom, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 71
L. Ed. 2d 1, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982).
Further, the majority overlooks that the
jury already had much of this evidence of
violent or prior criminal conduct before it
and that the presentation of available,
relevant evidence at sentencing would not
have subjected Abdur' Rahman to
additional statutory aggravating factors.
The mitigating elements of this evidence
would have served, instead, to present the
jury with an accurate and complete picture
of the person they were sentencing the
very purpose of a capital sentencing
hearing [... ]
[... ] Like the petitioner recently before the
Supreme Court, Abdur'Rahman has "a
constitutionally protected right . . . to
provide the jury with the mitigating
evidence that his trial counsel either failed
to discover or failed to offer." Wdlians,
120 S. Ct. at 1513. Given the total lack of
mitigating evidence presented at
Abdur'Rahman's sentencing hearing,
"counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the [sentencing hearing]
cannot be relied on as having produced a
just result." Stridland, 466 U.S. at 686; see
also A ustin, 126 F.3d at 848; Glenn u Tate,
71 F.3d 1204, 1210 (6th Cir. 1996). I
respectfully dissent.
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A Tennessee capital punishment case will
be among several the U.S. Supreme Court
will examine to determine major
constitutional questions about how the
death penalty in the United States is being
applied.
The central question in the case of Abu-
Ali Abdur'Rahman, on death row at the
state's Riverbend Maximum Security
Institution, is one that for years has
troubled justices of the Supreme Court as
well as those in state and federal appeals
courts: whether accused killers who are
poor are being adequately represented at
their criminal trials.
Abdur'Rahman was sentenced to die on
April 10 but was spared when the justices
blocked his execution to determine if he is
entitled to additional appeals.
If any case appears to fit the court's need
to look at how indigent defendants are
represented at their trials, the case of
Abdur'Rahman stands out. He was
convicted in the 1986 stabbing death of
Patrick Daniels of Nashville, an action
Abdur'Rahman said he took to stop the
alleged drug dealer from selling narcotics
to children.
Abdur'Rahman's current attorneys argue
that his trial attorneys failed him by not
providing a better defense. For one of his
trial attorneys, it marked his first capital
case. That trial attorney said recently that
he and the other lawyers representing
Abdur'Rahman never discussed a defense
strategy for the trial or for the
phase.
sentencing
Moreover, they acknowledged they relied
on information from the Davidson
County prosecutors, including evidence of
blood on Abdur'Rahman's clothing. That
later was determined to be paint. And they
did not mention their client's history of
sexual and physical abuse and his mental
problems.
All of these issues should be plenty for the
justices to ponder. Other cases offer the
questions of whether states can execute
persons who are mentally retarded and
whether it is constitutional for a judge --
not a jury -- to decide a death sentence.
An adage has it that good constitutional
law does not always come from the best
cases, and a brutal murder case in which
no one is arguing for complete innocence
might fall into that category.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Constitution
and numerous decisions by the
Supreme Court over the years have
guaranteed defendants the right to
effective counsel in their trials. That
guarantee should be just as important
as the assurance that the accused is
innocent until proved guilty.
Abdur'Rahman's case before the high
court could go far in ensuring those
long-cherished standards remain intact.
Copyright a 2002 The Knoxville
News-Sentinel Co.
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Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman stabbed a drug
dealer six times in the chest and left the
man's girlfriend with a butcher knife
wedged in her back.
He said he wanted to make Nashville a
safer place for children when he brutally
killed Patrick Daniels and stabbed Norma
Jean Norman as the woman's two
daughters cowered in a room next door.
Sixteen years later, Abdur'Rahman, 51,
faces execution by lethal injection for the
murder, the second he has committed.
Early Sunday morning he was moved to a
special "death watch" cell at Riverbend
Maximum Security Institution.
His attorneys continued to prepare for
today's hearing in Davidson County
Circuit Court, where they hope to
convince Judge Walter Kurtz that they
need more time to consider claims that
their client's trial was unfair.
If all appeals fail, he will die at 1 a.m.
Wednesday, becoming only the second
person executed in Tennessee since 1960.
On Friday, Gov. Don Sundquist denied
Abdur'Rahman executive clemency, and
the Tennessee Supreme Court denied a
stay of execution over claims of racial
discrimination during jury selection.
An appeal remains in U.S. Supreme Court
alleging prosecutorial misconduct.
Abdur'Rahman was known as James Lee
Jones Jr. until he was sentenced to death
row in 1987 and converted to Islam.
His spiritual adviser, Vanderbilt
psychologist Linda Manning, said
Abdur'Rahman's life has been filled with
violence since he was child. She says he
suffered horrible physical and mental
abuse from his father, a military
policeman, and he and his brother and
sister all suffered mental problems as a
result. His brother, Mark, committed
suicide in 1996.
Abdur'Rahman began getting into trouble
as a boy and had a juvenile crime record
by 14. He joined the Army in 1968 at 17
but received an undesirable discharge a
year later because of emotional problems.
He went AWOL three times and twice
attempted suicide.
The day after his discharge, he was
arrested for armed robbery on the Army
post. He was convicted and sentenced to
four years to a federal prison in Virginia.
While there, prison records show,
Abdur'Rahman was raped numerous
times, and doctors described him as
"highly disturbed."
In 1972, he stabbed to death a fellow
inmate and was convicted of second-
degree murder. He said he killed the man
because he was tired of forced sex. He
received a life sentence but was paroled in
1983.
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After his parole, he moved to Chicago,
where he worked as a janitor and with
children living in housing projects. He
moved to the Nashville area two years
later to be closer to his brother, then a
solider at Fort Campbell, Ky.
For a year, he stayed out of trouble. He
married and got a job loading boxes at the
National Baptist Publishing Board, where
he made friends with Devalle Miller.
Their boss, Allen Boyd, told them about
the Southeastern Gospel Ministry, a quasi-
religious paramilitary group in Nashville
whose goal was to cleanse the black
community of drugs.
AbdurRahman took the group's ideals to
heart, even though he used drugs. On
Feb. 16, 1986, after buying drugs from
Daniels, he decided to scare Daniels from
ever selling to children.
The next day, AbdurRahhman, armed with
a shotgun, and Miller, with an unloaded
pistol, returned to Daniels's apartment
under the guise of buying more drugs.
Once inside, the men confronted Daniels
and Norman. Sleeping in another room
were Norman's two daughters, 8-year-old
Katrina and 9- year-old Shawana. They
awoke when they heard Abdur'Rahman's
shouting.
"He told me to my face, if I didn't get my
kids back in the room, he would snap one
of their necks," Norman testified this
month during a clemency hearing for
Abdur'Rahman.
Abdur'Rahman then forced Norman and
Daniels to the floor, bound their hands
and feet with duct tape, and taped shut
their eyes and mouths.
Abdur'Rahman claims he remembers
nothing after that, although at the
sentencing phase of his trial he admitted
to the attacks.
Miller, who testified against
Abdur'Rahman as part of a plea
agreement, said the motive for the attack
was not religion but robbery.
He said Daniels cried and begged the men
not to hurt anyone. He said
Abdur'Rahman grabbed a butcher knife
from the kitchen and began his attack. He
stabbed Daniels six times, puncturing his
heart four times.
The two men fled. Norman, the knife still
in her back, struggled to her daughters,
who called for help.
A day later, AbdurRahman was arrested
at work Miller was captured a year later in
Pennsylvania. Miller pleaded guilty and
was released on parole in 1993.
Abdur'Rahman's current attorneys label
his sentence unjust. The original trial
attorneys never told jurors about the
violent abuse Abdur'Rahman suffered as
child or his mental problems, which they
contend may have made a difference i
their sentence decision.
Eight of the original trial jurors now say
they would have chosen a life sentence if
they had known Abdur'Rahman's history.
"The issue isn't whether he should have
gotten the death sentence, it's a question
of whether the execution should be
carried out," attorney Brad MacLean said
at the clemency hearing. "It's an issue of
mercy.
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MacLean and his colleagues point to how
Abdur'Rahman changed in the last 15
years.
He is the longest-serving elected
representative on the inmate council and
the warden's designated mediator for
inmate disputes. He has earned a paralegal
degree and another for constitutional
litigation, his attorneys say.
For 10 years, Abdur'Rahman has been a
regular guest on Nashville radio station
WFSK's Positive African-American Men
and Women United, helping counsel
troubled children and teens.
"Abu-Ali has been a constant assistance to
children who don't take advice from
people like me," WFSK's Sydney
Windfield said at Abdur'Rahman's
clemency hearing. "When we say weve
got Abu-Ali on the radio live from Death
Row, that has an impact."
If he is executed, Abdur'Rahman will
become the first black man put to death in
Tennessee since William Tines was
electrocuted Nov. 7, 1960, for beating and
raping a woman in Oliver Springs.
Copyright o 2002 The Commercial
Appeal
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The Davidson County jury never heard a
word about Abu-Ali's history of being
abused, neglected, assaulted, and mentally
ill all relevant factors when considering
the death penalty. [... ]
"Had counsel presented the other
evidence of (Abu-Ali's) background and
mental history, there is more than a
reasonable probability that at least one
juror would have voted for a life sentence
rather than the death penalty," U.S. Dist.
Judge Todd Campbell said.
Campbell's ruling was overturned by one
vote by the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Last year, eight of 12 jurors signed
affidavits saying they would have rejected
the death penalty for Abu-Ali if they had
known about his history of mental illness.
"Given all the history of mental illness
(Abu-Ali) has, I would have voted for a
life sentence. I believe people with
problems can be helped," juror Loretta
Simpson wrote.
Five jurors said they also would have
rejected the death penalty if they had
known Abu-Ali's 1972 murder conviction
was related to homosexual attacks on him
in prison.
"I especially think we should have known
the details of his previous murder
conviction being related to homosexual
threats in prison. That previous
conviction swayed me to vote for death,"
juror James Wimberley wrote.
"I don't want (Abu-Ali) to be put to death.
I would like the governor to spare his
life," juror Jimmy Swarner wrote.
One juror said she misunderstood the
sentencing instructions.
"I thought that it was the jury's duty to try
to reach a unanimous decision on the
sentence, and if a unanimous decision was
not reached then it would be a mistrial. I
did not know or understand that if the
jury was not unanimous on the death
penalty then the defendant would receive
a life sentence," wrote juror Bonnie
Meyer, one of the last jurors to vote for
death.
"If I had understood this then I probably
would not have changed my mind and I
would have continued to vote for a life
sentence." [... ]
Copyright o 2002 The Commercial
Appeal
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The Changing Debate Over the Death Penalty
The New York Times
June 22, 2002
Stuart Banner
The Supreme Court's ruling Thursday that
it is unconstitutional to execute mentally
retarded people was good news for
opponents of the death penalty. They
hailed it as a landmark decision that
signals a fundamental shift in the court's
stance toward capital punishment.
Their celebration is understandable. But it
will almost certainly be temporary. History
shows that public opposition to capital
punishment vacillates over time. And
though the Supreme Court is less
responsive to shifts in popular opinion
than state lawmakers, Congress or the
president, it is not immune to them. In the
past few years, opponents of the death
penalty have won several victories. The
governors of Illinois and Maryland have
declared moratoriums on conducting
executions until flaws in those states'
criminal justice systems are eliminated. A
federal district judge in New York has
announced that he intends to find the
federal death penalty statute
unconstitutional on the ground that
innocent people are too likely to be
executed. Meanwhile, the annual number
of executions has been declining, from 98
in 1999 to 66 in 2001.
But throughout American history, support
for the death penalty has risen and fallen
with the times. In periods when
Americans have tended to think of crime
as the product of the criminal's free will,
the criminal justice system tilts toward
retribution, and capital punishment has
grown more popular. In periods when
they have paid more attention to causes
other than the criminal's free will -- the
criminal's social context, for example --
the system has emphasized rehabilitation,
and the popularity of the death penalty
has waned.
The past 30 years were a period of strong
support for capital punishment, as part of
a trend toward retribution in criminal
sentencing. (This trend is also evident in
other sentencing measures like "three
strikes" laws.) For the past 250 years,
however, such periods have always been
followed by times of growing opposition
to the death penalty.
There is certainly nothing inexorable
about this pattern. But we may well be
seeing the beginning of the next long
swing away from the death penalty. In the
past, the early signs have been the
abolition of capital punishment for those
criminals for whom the death penalty
seemed disproportionately severe. In the
18th century minor criminals like
counterfeiters and horse-stealers were the
first to be spared the death penalty; in the
19th century, it was rapists and robbers
who were spared. Today it's the mentally
retarded, and tomorrow it may be 16- and
17-year-olds, who are still eligible to be
executed in some states.
In the relatively short time that the
Supreme Court has considered capital
punishment to raise constitutional
questions, it has followed the oscillations
of public opinion. Furman vs. Georgia,
the 1972 case that found existing death-
sentencing schemes unconstitutional, was
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decided near the peak of opposition to the
death penalty, as measured by public
opinion polls. For the next 30 years, as
capital punishment gained support, the
court gradually watered down the
restnctions against capital punishment in
the Furman case. And now, just when that
support is showing signs of weakening,
the court has imposed the first important
new constitutional restriction on capital
sentencing in many years.
There is nothing unusual or improper
about this link between public opinion
and the court's decisions. The justices are
chosen by an elected president and
confirmed by an elected Senate, of course.
And just as important, they are not
hermits; they are influenced by the same
trends in thought that influence us all.
Unlike legislators or executives, however,
judges cannot simply rewrite, repeal or
veto laws they do not like. The Supreme
Court must place each ruling it makes in
the context of its past decisions; it must
follow precedent. But it is not as difficult
for the court to change course as is
commonly thought. Indeed, its conclusion
that executing mentally retarded offenders
now is cruel and unusual punishment
directly contradicts a decision it issued
only 13 years ago.
Claims of cruel and unusual punishment
have long been evaluated according to
"evolving standards of decency." In such
cases, the court must ask what those
standards are and, as it acknowledged in
its decision Thursday, the ongoing public
debate "informs our answer."
This kind of analysis by its very nature
calls on the court to consider broadly held
public views. If in the future public
opinion evolves in favor of executing
retarded people, states will likely adopt
definitions of mental retardation that are
more restrictive, encompassing fewer and
fewer defendants. It would not be
surprising then to see the court approve
those restrictions until the principle stated
in this week's case gets narrowed, perhaps
into irrelevance.
[Stuart Banner is a professor of law at
UCLA]
Copyright © 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Among the several landmark decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court as Its
latest term was drawing to a close, there's
one whose enduring significance may well
lie not in what the justices did, but in how
they did it.
In its June 20 decision in Atkins v.
Virginia, which banned the capital
punishment of mentally retarded convicts,
the justices explicitly relied on broad
popular opinion outside the court to
determine a question of constitutional law.
The ruling came as a welcome shift.
Under Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
the court has generally not been known
for its humility or its deference to the
opinions of others. But it is worth
remembering that the Constitution itself
begins with the words "We the People,"
not "We the Court."
There have been other recent cases
involving the Eighth Amendment, which
bans "cruel and unusual punishments," in
which the court has consulted public
views and practices as it considered what
counts as "unusual." But in the Atkins
decision, the court, by a 6 to 3 vote, took
this idea two steps further. Citing public
opinion polls and recent votes in state
legislatures, the justices discerned "a
national consensus" to prohibit the
execution of low-IQ convicts. This
persuaded the court to overturn a 1989
decision in which it had upheld such
executions.
The landscape has changed considerably
since '89, the court noted. Back then, 16
states prohibited the death penalty in such
cases; today, that number is 30. Indeed,
since '89, only five states have executed
convicts known to be mentally retarded.
The court also cited "polling data"
showing "a widespread consensus among
Americans, even those who support the
death penalty, that executing the mentally
retarded is wrong."
So what does any of this have to do with
constitutional law? Doesn't the court's
decision to overrule precedent on the
basis of opinion polls and current trends
in state practice mock the idea of enduring
principles of constitutional law immune
from gusts of public opinion and passing
legal fads?
Well, no. The majority's straight- forward
argument was that executing the mentally
retarded had indeed "become truly
unusual" in America today. In effect, the
Eighth Amendment was written with a
built-in escalator clause. Over time, harsh
punishments that were once common
have become less common as society has
turned against them, and when these
punishments become truly unusual, they
thereby become ripe for constitutional
invalidation. Through the words "cruel
and unusual," the founders in effect told
modern judges to pay attention to
contemporary penal patterns and
contemporary popular attitudes about
punishment.
This was precisely the analytic framework
used by the court in the earlier case, Penry
v. Lynaugh, which held that, 13 years ago,
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death for the mentally retarded was not an
unusual sanction when measured by actual
practice and public sentiment. By noting
dramatic trends since 1989, the court's
decision in Atkins was faithful to its logic
in Penry, even as it overruled Penry's
result. Indeed, two of the members of the
Penry majority, including its author,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined the
Atkins majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Antonin Scalia were also
members of the Penry majority, but they
issued sharp dissents in Atkins, joined by
Justice Clarence Thomas, who only came
onto the court in 1991. (Interestingly,
none of the Atkins dissenters challenged
the basic idea that punishments that were
clearly permissible at the country's
founding and throughout most of
American history could at some later time
become cruel and unusual because of
changed sentiments of ordinary citizens
and elected lawmakers. Rather, the Atkins
dissenters simply denied that death
sentences for mentally retarded inmates
have indeed become so unusual as to be
unconstitutional.)
The dissenters pooh-poohed public
opinion polls as soft and unreliable, highly
dependent on the precise wording of a
given pollster's question and other
subtleties. But the very polls discussed by
the dissenters themselves reveal a striking
pattern: No matter who conducted the
poll, or where it was conducted, or the
precise wording of the question, strong
majorities of ordinary citizens opposed
these executions. And given that actual
patterns of current punishment help
define what is considered "unusual,"
shouldn't actual sentiments of current
Americans likewise help define what is
considered "cruel"?
As a legal scholar (and an optimist) I
would love to see this decision help
redefine the relationship between the
people and the Supreme Court. Many
Americans today look to the court as the
ultimate -- perhaps the only real --
interpreter of the Constitution. In this,
they are mistaken. Yet in its rhetoric and
results, the court itself has encouraged this
view, especially in the three decades since
Watergate and Vietnam, which
besmirched the political branches while
leaving the judiciary relatively unscathed.
Earlier generations of Americans had a
more democratic and participatory view of
constitutional interpretation. Nowhere
does the Constitution proclaim the
Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter, or
even first among equals (Congress, in fact,
is mentioned first); and many early
presidents -- including Jefferson, Madison,
Jackson and Lincoln -- viewed the
judiciary as simply one of three equal
branches, each of which had a key role in
constitutional interpretation. Early justices
often showed great deference to the views
of the public and the political branches.
From the very first words of its preamble,
the Constitution aimed to create a
democracy founded on ordinary citizens.
Unelected judges would help enforce
constitutional provisions, but the
provisions themselves came from ordinary
people who ratified the document and
from mass movements that periodically
mobilized for democratizing amendments.
Much of the Constitution evinced more
confidence in citizen jurors than in
insulated judges; indeed, the Eighth
Amendment itself reflected uneasiness
about tasks that judges might perform
unchecked by citizen juries, such as setting
bail and imposing criminal sentences. The
founders expected that popular juries
would temper the hardheartedness of
some professional judges.
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The point may well remain true today
Juries have proved more merciful than
judges in imposing the death penalty, and
in a case decided only four days after
Atkins, Ring v. Arizona, the court
overruled yet another death penalty
precedent. This one had allowed judges to
bypass juries in capital sentencing. Like
Atkins, the Ring decision admirably seeks
to integrate the perspectives of ordinary
citizens into the punishment process.
The decisions represent an important shift
for the Rehnquist court. In the last eight
terms, the court has invalidated
congressional statutes in more than 30
cases -- four times the rate of the Warren
Court. The Rehnquist Court also
pointedly refused to overturn Roe v.
Wade, which legalized abortion, in part
because so many ordinary citizens had
questioned the decision, and the justices
preferred not to encourage such criticism
of the court.
The dissenting justices in Atkins claimed
that, once again, the court was acting
imperialistically. But by banning a practice
that only five states have recently engaged
in, and that most citizens across the
country oppose, Atkins can be read to fit
a more restrained vision of judicial review.
(Given that one of the particular concerns
of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted
after the Civil War, was to prevent former
Confederate states from imposing harsh
punishments out of sync with national
norms, it's worth noting that all five of
these states come from the old
Confederacy.)
The Atkins decision exemplifies an
interpretive method with broad potential
application beyond the Eighth
Amendment. If the justices are willing to
credit the views of the public and elected
officials on the question of which
punishments are cruel and unusual, the
court might likewise pay more heed to
democratic deliberations about which
searches and seizures are reasonable and
which unenumerated rights are truly
fundamental in modem America.
Finding ways to consult broader public
sentiment when interpreting the
Constitution is often a good thing, and
one that need not jeopardize individual
rights. If the justices are truly interested in
listening to their fellow citizens -- as all
nine claim to be -- they will find that We,
the People, have a lot of ideas worth
hearing.
Akhil Amar is a professor of
constitutional law at Yale and author of
"The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction" (Yale University Press).
Copyright ( 2002, The Washington Post
Co.
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A U.S. district judge in New York ruled
yesterday that the federal death penalty is
unconstitutional because it creates "undue
risk" of executing innocent defendants,
the latest sign that DNA exonerations of
death row inmates have begun to affect
the way courts and legislatures think about
capital punishment.
In telling federal prosecutors that they
may not seek the death penalty for two
heroin dealers accused of murdering a
government informant, Judge Jed S.
Rakoff wrote that wrongful death
sentences are more common than
Congress believed when it passed the
death penalty law in 1994.
Now, he wrote, it is "fully foreseeable that
in enforcing the death penalty, a
meaningful number of innocent people
will be executed who otherwise would
eventually be able to prove their
innocence.
And that, said Rakoff, an appointee of
President Bill Clinton, is "tantamount to
foreseeable, state-sponsored murder of
innocent human beings." The ultimate
impact of Rakoff's decision is highly
uncertain. It would appear to run counter
to the last quarter-century's worth of
Supreme Court precedent, which has
sought to regulate the death penalty but
consistently treated it as a constitutional
form of punishment. However, anti-death
penalty organizations greeted Rakoff's
order as more evidence that their cause is
gaining momentum, at least symbolically.
The Bush administration said yesterday it
is reviewing Rakoff's ruling, but legal
analysts regarded an appeal as a near-
certainty.
"The determination of how to punish
criminal activity within the limits of the
Constitution is a matter entrusted to the
democratically elected legislature, not to
the federal judiciary," said Justice
Department spokeswoman Barbara
Comstock. "Congress passed the Federal
Death Penalty Act to save lives, and the
Supreme Court of the United States has
repeatedly said the death penalty is
constitutional."
Kent Scheidegger of the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation, a Sacramento-based
nonprofit group that supports capital
punishment, said Rakoff is "essentially
saying the Constitution requires certainty
of guilt before we can execute anyone,
and that is not the law."
Rakoff implied his decision could be
overturned, either by the New York-based
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit,
or by the Supreme Court. "[N]o judge has
a monopoly on reason," he wrote, noting
that he "fully expects [my] analysis to be
critically scrutinized."
The decision comes soon after the
Supreme Court abolished capital
punishment for the mentally retarded -- in
part, the high court said, because retarded
defendants may be particularly susceptible
to wrongful conviction or sentencing.
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The ruling also follows death penalty
moratoriums in Illinois and Maryland, and
comes as the Senate Judiciary Committee
is preparing to vote on a bill sponsored by
Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) that would
promote access to DNA evidence and
legal counsel for both state and federal
death penalty defendants.
"These decisions spotlight various flaws in
the death penalty system, and the flaws
add up to a system that is broken," Leahy
said yesterday.
"More so than at any other time since the
early '80s, there are people of all stripes in
legislatures and courthouses thinking
about the fact that we've got a problem
here," said George Kendall, assistant
counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, which opposes
capital punishment.
Though the wrongful convictions it cited
were in state cases, Rakoff's order applies
only to the federal system. There are 27
convicted murderers on federal death row.
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft has
been aggressive in seeking the death
penalty in federal cases, having ordered
prosecutors to ask for capital punishment
in 20 of 45 possible cases through March
1, frequently overruling prosecutors.
Rakoff, who said in his 1995 Senate
confirmation hearings that he would
follow Supreme Court capital punishment
precedent and that the death penalty
"does not in any way offend my personal
feelings," announced on April 25 his
intention to strike down the federal death
penalty, but gave Justice Department
lawyers one last chance to persuade him
not to.
The government argued that DNA testing
is now available to defendants prior to
trial, thus reducing the future risk of
wrongful convictions; that there was no
evidence that any of the federal
defendants convicted so far was actually
innocent; and that the Supreme Court had
ruled in 1993 that death row inmates
raising last-minute claims with new
evidence of their innocence should face
an "extraordinarily high" burden of proof.
Rakoff countered that not every case turns
on physical evidence; that federal cases
were as vulnerable to error as state cases;
and that most of the justices involved in
the Supreme Court's 1993 ruling had
agreed that executing the innocent would
violate the Constitution.
In recent days, the Supreme Court
rebuffed a case based on another
common criticism of the federal death
penalty -- that it is racially biased.
A 2000 study by the Clinton
administration's Justice Department found
that 80 percent of federal death penalty
prosecutions involved minority
defendants.
But in a two-page unsigned opinion issued
Friday, the court, without published
dissent, ruled that an African American
facing capital punishment in a federal case
in Michigan could not press a racial bias
claim because these statistics do not prove
that federal prosecutors had shown any
differential treatment toward defendants
in cases similar to his.
Copyright © 2002 The Washington Post
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01-1184 United States v. Recio
Ruling Below: (United States v. Recio, 9 " Cir., 258 F.3d 1069, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 38589,
57 Fed. R Evid. Serv. (Callghan) 813)
The court held that, as a matter of law, there was insufficient evidence to convict the
defendants of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute drugs. Due to government
intervention, only the pre-seizure involvement of the defendants was relevant to the charges.
The court upheld a conviction on possession with intent to distribute. The court denied a
rehearing en banc. U.S. v. Recio, 270 F.3d 845 ( 9 ,h Cir. 2001).
Question Presented: Whether conspiracy ends as a matter of law when the government
has frustrated its objective?
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee
V.
Francisco Jimenez RECIO, Defendant-Appellant,
Adrian LOPEZ-MEZA. Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided September 27, 2000.
BROWNING, Circuit Judge:
[Recio and Lopez-Meza were arrested for
driving a truck carrying $12 million of
cocaine and marijuana. They had been
called to pick up the truck after the
original driver had been arrested and
agreed to call for replacement drivers.
Both Recio and Lopez-Meza were
convicted of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute controlled substances.
Recio was convicted of possession with
intent to distribute.
On appeal they argued that they should
have been acquitted based on United
States v. Cruz, 127 F.3d 791, 795 (9th Cir.
1997), in which the court held that
defendants could not be charged with
conspiracy when brought into the scheme
only after law enforcement had become
involved and that involvement was caused
by that intervention.]
Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government as we must,
see United States v. Yossunthorn, 167
F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1999), we must
determine whether any rational jury could
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza were
involved in the conspiracy prior to the
initial seizure of the drugs on November
18, 1998. We focus on the evidence
presented at their second trial.
The district court held, and the
government argues, that there was some
evidence tying Lopez-Meza and Jimenez
Recio to the conspiracy before the drugs
were initially seized. The district court
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stated that "Lopez's and [Jimenez Recio]'s
words and conduct, upon their picking up
the truck in Nampa and subsequently
being stopped by the authorities, provided
a probative link between themselves and
the specific conspiracy charge." Further,
before the initial seizure, both Jimenez
Recio and Lopez-Meza allegedly called the
same telephone number in Idaho and
different numbers in Chicago using
prepaid calling cards.
This is insufficient evidence of guilt.
Nothing Defendants said or did on
November 18, 1998 directly links them to
the pre-seizure conspiracy. That Jimenez
Recio and Lopez-Meza lied to officers
upon arrest points only to knowledge that
they were involved in illicit activity at that
time and provides no basis for concluding
that they were involved in the conspiracy
beforehand. There is also no proof that
Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza used the
prepaid calling cards; anyone could have
used them by dialing the pin number
code. In fact, it is clear that at least two of
the calls on Lopez-Meza's card were made
by someone else. The government
produced no evidence identifying the
participants in or the contents of the
conversations. The phone numbers called
are not probative of a conspiracy. The
Idaho calls were to "Nu Acres," where the
drugs were apparently destined, but the
number called was a communal telephone
at a migrant camp where Lopez-Meza
lived. The Chicago calls were all to
different telephone numbers.
The other evidence of Defendants' pre-
seizure involvement in the conspiracy is
also insufficient. The government argues
that Jimenez Recio's renewal of his
"nonowner" driver's insurance shortly
before his arrest demonstrates his
anticipation of driving the drugladen
truck, yet, the government expert testified
that Jimenez Recio would not have been
involved in the delivery the following day
absent the government "sting," and thus
could not have anticipated being called on
to drive. As for the pagers they carried,
one would expect whoever recruited them
to have outfitted them with the standard
equipment used in the trade. Indeed, in
light of the strange turn of events this
drug shipment had taken, the main
conspirators would want to stay in
especially close communication with their
drivers
On the other hand, there is strong
evidence that Lopez-Meza and Jimenez
Recio were not involved in the pre-seizure
conspiracy. The government's main
witness, Arce, had never met either
Lopez-Meza or Jimenez Recio before the
drugs were seized. Once the police
decided to continue the drug operation,
Arce called an Arizona pager number to
arrange for a drop-off, but neither Lopez-
Meza nor Jimenez Recio were among the
three callers who responded to the page.
One of the callers returning the page
stated that he would send a "muchacho"
("boy" in Spanish) to get the truck,
suggesting that Defendants were simply
drivers hired at the last minute.
Furthermore, the initial conspiracy did not
envision a drop-off in the Karcher Mall
parking lot where Lopez-Meza and
Jimenez Recio retrieved the truck -- the
police initiated the arrangement to meet
there as part of their post-seizure "sting"
operation. Indeed, Arce and the
government's own expert testified that
Arce and Sotello, the original driver,
would have driven the drug truck to the
Nu Acres "stash house" themselves had
they not been stopped and arrested.
Taken as a whole, the evidence was
insufficient for a rational jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendants were involved in the
conspiracy to deliver the drugs prior to
the initial seizure of the truck.
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The government also relied on an
additional broader conspiracy theory to
circumvent Cruz on retrial, providing
detailed expert testimony demonstrating
that the drug shipment bore the hallmarks
of a complex and sophisticated operation
that likely involved more than one
shipment. However, the limited role
Defendants played in the November 18
shipment alone is insufficient to charge
them with complicity for any prior loads.
Cf. United States v. Umagat, 998 F.2d
770, 773-774 (9th Cir. 1993) (minor role
of defendants in single transaction does
not permit imputed liability for the
broader conspiracy). Therefore, this
theory too hinges on proof of prior
involvement.
The strongest evidence that Defendants
might be repeat players in drug trafficking
were the multiple receipts for expired
non-owner insurance policies found on
Jimenez Recio. This suggests he habitually
drove vehicles he did not own, from
which a jury could further infer that
Jimenez Recio regularly drove drug trucks
for the conspiracy. It is a close question as
to whether this inference, in conjunction
with the other circumstantial evidence,
could suffice to eliminate reasonable
doubts among rational jurors as to
Jimenez Recio's guilt (and by extension,
perhaps Lopez-Meza's as well).
Ultimately, however, we remain
unpersuaded. The insurance can also be
accounted for by alternative explanations.
For example, Jimenez Recio might work
as a driver for legitimate businesses. The
trafficking conspirators might naturally
have turned to such an individual once
Sotello was arrested (assuming alternate
drivers within the conspiracy were
unavailable). Jimenez Recio was also an
illegal immigrant. As such, he would be
reluctant to testify as to his legitimate
work, lest he jeopardize his employers and
his own future employment; this could
explain the defense's silence on the
matter.
As for Lopez-Meza's multiple links to his
uncle Jose Meza (a.ka "Raul") and to Nu
Acres, the "stash house" where both
Lopez-Meza and Jose Meza apparently
lived at times, these are hardly probative
of nefarious activity. Much of the dissent's
reasoning from these facts amounts to
guilt-by-association. If Lopez-Meza
indeed lived at Nu Acres, so did many
other immigrants. His presence on the
scene and familial ties to Jose Meza just as
readily support the theory that he was
simply a convenient substitute recruited at
the last minute.
[The court went on to address Recio's
conviction on the possession charges.
The court found that the district court did
not err (1) in allowing evidence of the
odor of marijuana in his car, (2) in
denying a motion for a mistrial because
the government called their destination a
"stash house" as it did not effect the jury,
nor (3) in allowing the expert testimony of
a special agent.
The court found that Recio's counsel's
failure to move for acquittal on the charge
of possession with intent to distribute
constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel, because the judge granted such a
motion to Recio's co-defendant.]
The conspiracy convictions are reversed
and dismissed with prejudice because of
insufficient evidence.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART.
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FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion but write
separately to make the point that even if
the evidence presented at the second trial,
when taken in the light most favorable to
the government, could (in the view of the
dissent) suffice to convict the defendants
on the broader conspiracy charge, their
convictions should be overturned based
on the insufficiency of the evidence at the
first trial. At the first trial, the government
argued and presented evidence relating
solely to the single load conspiracy. It was
only after a mistrial was declared that the
government argued and presented
additional evidence at the second trial
relating to the alleged existence of a
broader conspiracy.
GOULD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I respectfully dissent because I take a
different view of the evidence, under the
proper legal standards. This case poses an
important issue concerning the scope of
reasonable inferences that may be drawn
by a jury from evidence of criminal
conspiracy. I respectfully dissent because I
would hold that there was unmistakably
more than sufficient evidence in the
second trial to uphold the jury's verdict.
The majority today errs on this crucial
issue, and then does not reach the other
issues presented by the parties regarding
the second trial. Having also reviewed
these other issues, I would affirm the
district court's decision to deny the
defendants' motions for a judgment of
acquittal after the second trial, and let the
jury verdict stand.
[III. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the evidence]
Once a conspiracy exists, evidence
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt
defendant's connection with the
conspiracy, even though the connection is
slight, is sufficient to convict defendant of
knowing participation in the conspiracy. "
United States v. Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d
1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
* * *
When we view the evidence here in the
light most favorable to the government, a
reasonable jury could have found, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that there was
sufficient evidence linking Jimenez Recio
and Lopez-Meza to a conspiracy that
ended when police officers seized the
drugs from Arce and Sotelo at 1:18 a.m.
on November 18, 1997. Moreover, a
reasonable jury could have found evidence
sufficient to show constructive knowledge
on the part of Jimenez Recio and Lopez-
Meza of a broader conspiracy involving







B. Other alleged errors
[The dissent went on to address the claims
of the defendants not reached by the
majority. It found the defendants'
assertions of error in jury instruction
unpersuasive. Nor did it find any merit in
the defendants' arguments against the
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admission of certain evidence. The
dissent also rejected the defendants'
motion for mistrial because of
prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, the
dissent was not persuaded that expert
testimony had been improperly admitted.]
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority correctly is concerned that
proof be made of criminal conspiracy
beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
majority incorrectly invades the province
of a jury when it holds that evidence in
the second trial was insufficient. The legal
test to determine if a second trial was
permissible requires us to assess the
boundaries of permissible inferences that
a jury reasonably could have drawn when
viewing all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government. In this
light, the evidence was sufficient to permit
the jury to determine, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that there was a serious criminal
conspiracy in which Jimenez Recio and
Lopez-Meza were involved before the
drugs were seized. Moreover, the evidence
was sufficient for a jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that there
existed a broader conspiracy -- involving
more than one load -- in which Jimenez
Recio and Lopez-Meza had actual or
constructive knowledge and for which
Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza took
deliberate steps. Jimenez Recio and
Lopez-Meza sought to advance the
conspiracy's unlawful aims by their own
unlawful acts.
The majority addresses only a part of the
evidence, ignoring key proof considered
herein. The majority takes no heed of the
fact that a jury was properly instructed to
find guilt only if proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. In returning its verdict,
the jury said that it had no reasonable
doubt. The evidence in the second trial is
sufficient to support the jury's decision. I
would affirm the district court's correct
decision to let the jury verdict stand after
the second trial.
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The Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to
decide when a conspiracy ends. At issue in
the Idaho drug case, which will probably
be heard next fall, is whether those who
join an illegal conspiracy after the
government frustrates its purpose are
guilty of the crime of conspiracy.
In asking that the high court review the
drug case, the federal government told the
justices that an eventual decision would
have a profound effect on a variety of
investigations, from violent crime to
terronsm.
In the early morning hours of Nov. 18,
1997, a Nevada police officer stopped a
northbound flatbed truck occupied by
Manuel Sotelo and Ramiro Arce.
The truck turned out to be carrying 369
pounds of marijuana and nearly 15
pounds of cocaine. Police placed a street
value of between $10 million and $12
million.
The men told police they were supposed
to drive the truck to Nampa, Idaho, and
leave it at a mall.
Arce agreed to cooperate with a police
sting. Once officers had parked the truck
at the Nampa mall, Arce called an Arizona
pager number.
When a caller returned the page, Arce told
him the truck's location and was told the
caller would send "a muchacho to come
and get the truck."
About three hours later, Francisco
Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza
drove up to the parked truck.
Recio got out of the car and into the
truck, and he and Lopez-Meza drove west
on different back roads.
Eventually, police decided to stop them.
A federal grand jury in Idaho indicted the
two men for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana,
and with conspiring to possess cocaine
and marijuana.
Both men were found guilty on both
counts. A federal judge refused motions
that the men be acquitted because of lack
of evidence.
Eventually, a divided appeals court panel
reversed the judge, ruling 2-1 that the
government had presented no evidence
the two men were involved in a
conspiracy before the drugs were seized in
Nevada.
The panel majority said the men appeared
to have been hired at the last minute, and
downplayed evidence that both had
pagers when they were arrested.
When the full U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit refused to hear the case,
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The Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to
review a ruling that questions the way the
government catches and charges
suspected drug dealers and terrorists.
The case, stemming from narcotics arrests
of two immigrants near an Idaho mall, is
the first with implications for terronsm to
catch the court's interest since Sept. 11.
The Bush administration played up the
issue in urging the court to intervene. The
government lost in a lower court and will
get to argue for a reversal in the court
term that begins next fall.
The case revolves around prosecutors' use
of conspiracy charges for crimes that have
already been discovered and prevented by
law officers.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in
a string of cases dating back five years, has
said that law officers cannot stop a crime,
lure people into getting involved with the
help of informants, then charge them with
being part of the conspiracy.
That's what the appeals court said
happened to Francisco Jimenez Recio and
Adrian Lopez-Meza when they were
arrested during a sting operation involving
a flatbed truck loaded with about $12
million worth of cocaine and marijuana.
Officers had seized the truck and arrested
a driver and companion near Las Vegas in
1997- With the companion's help, lawmen
set up the sting operation at a mall in
Nampa. Recio and Lopez-Meza were
arrested after showing up there to get the
truck.
The 9th Circuit said Recio and Lopez-
Meza would likely not have been involved
in the conspiracy had they not been lured
into it. The court added the government
did not prove any other involvement in a
conspiracy.
Solicitor General Theodore Olson told
the high court in a filing that the appeals
court finding "exonerates culpable
defendants and needlessly complicates the
prosecution of conspiracy cases."
"The vital need for undercover
government efforts both to apprehend
conspirators and to prevent their planned
offenses from actually occurring extends
far beyond drug cases. Similar legitimate
law enforcement tactics are crucial in
violent crime, terronsm and other
contexts," Olson wrote.
The two men had received prison
sentences of more than 10 years. Recio
also was convicted of possession of drugs
with intent to distribute, a conviction the
9th Circuit left undisturbed.
Thomas A. Sullivan, the attorney for the
two, told the court that prosecutors did
not have enough evidence for a
conspiracy charge. He said they could
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pursue a similar charge against Lopez-
Meza.
The men were wearing pagers and had
calling cards when they were arrested, the
chief evidence against them.
Olson said it should not matter if the
government intervenes during a crime. He
said under the standard of the appeals
court, officers who fear compromising
prosecutions would have to be careful in
stopping cnimes.
The case is United States v. Recio, 01-
1184
Copyright © 2002. The Associated Press
545
